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THE MARKET AS NEGOTIATION
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff* & Matthew T. Bodie**
Our economic system counts on markets to allocate most of our societal resources. The law
often treats markets as discrete entities, with a native intelligence and structure that provides
clear answers to questions about prices and terms. In reality, of course, markets are much
messier—they are agglomerations of negotiations by individual parties. Despite theoretical and
empirical work on markets and on negotiation, legal scholars have largely overlooked the connection between the two areas in considering how markets are constructed and regulated.
This Article brings together scholarship in law, economics, sociology, and psychology to better understand the role that negotiation plays in different types of marketplaces. Establishing the
concept of negotiation variance, we create a preliminary taxonomy of factors that shape such
variance and examine the differences between markets in the effects that negotiation can have on
transactions. In markets with high negotiation variance, parties can use their negotiation effectiveness to get much better deals. Although the law has not generally recognized negotiation’s role
in markets explicitly, judges and policymakers have at times taken negotiation variance into
account implicitly, making exceptions to standard doctrines to accommodate unbalanced outcomes. The Article examines the doctrines of common-law contract that reflect an understanding
of negotiation’s impact, and explores three particular markets where high variance negotiation
has a significant role: lawsuit settlements, corporate control, and employment. These examples
show how the law takes negotiation variance into account and illustrates the challenges in developing a response to individual negotiation differences across markets.
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INTRODUCTION
Negotiation—the essence of capitalism. There’s nothing like it.1

Markets are the engine of our economy. Rather than distributing goods
through a command-and-control system, we rely on markets to direct property, goods, and services to their most efficient use. Although the superiority
of markets as distribution devices was at one time the subject of intellectual
debate,2 today markets are so ingrained in our system that they are almost
invisible. And their domain continues to grow—more and more items that
were thought as personal, private, or not fit for markets are now coming
under their aegis.3
The market is also ubiquitous in legal scholarship. The basic law and
economics models are premised on the notion that markets are the best way
1 30 Rock: Hard Ball (NBC television broadcast Feb. 22, 2007) (Jack Donaghy).
2 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526, 529 n.1
(1945).
3 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Kidneys Without Money, 175 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 4,
5 (2019); Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (May 11–12,
1998), in 21 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 93 (Grethe B. Peterson ed.,
2000).
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of facilitating the exchange of goods and services to achieve the highest level
of societal efficiency. However, the idea of “the market” is often discussed as
a monolithic entity—something of a black box. As long as certain assumptions hold, such as perfect information, rational actors, and zero transaction
costs, the parties will put their potential transaction into the “market,” and
the market will in turn determine the appropriate price and terms for the
exchange.4 But the market is not an entity in and of itself; it is instead a set
of transactions between different parties with respect to particular goods or
services. The market price is simply the average of the prices—or even the
latest price that one party has decided to pay the other.5 And that price is
arrived at through negotiation.
This Article interrogates the idea of the market as a “black box” by thinking more deeply about markets as negotiations. It examines how markets are
structured and how negotiations play the central role in the working of the
market. It also examines how law plays a role in shaping those negotiations,
for better or worse.6 Along with common-law contract law’s treatment of
negotiation, we also look at specific examples of market construction
through negotiation rules: the market for legal settlements, the market for
corporate control, and the market for labor. In these examples, we discuss
the effects of negotiation variance in these markets and whether the law has
taken this variance into account.
Part I explores the structure of markets within our economy, and the
legal system’s role in constructing markets. Part II highlights the ways in
which some markets are merely amalgamations of individual negotiations,
and then explores more deeply the factors that impact negotiation, focusing
largely but not exclusively on negotiation effectiveness. This Part examines
the contours of negotiation skill and its distinct nature as compared to the
law and economics model of the market, such as rationality and information
asymmetry. Part III provides an initial taxonomy of negotiation variance
within markets to determine which types of markets allow for significant
negotiation effects. Finally, Part IV discusses the role of negotiation in contract law generally, as well as three particular markets: the market for legal
settlements, the market for corporate control, and the labor market. It teases
out the importance of negotiation to each of these markets and discusses
how negotiation variance may play a role in shaping transactions. Ultimately,
we must acknowledge and understand the role of negotiation in order to
manage its effects and redress the imbalances it can cause.
4 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 160 (19th ed. 2009).
5 Cf. Comm’r of Corps. & Tax’n v. Worcester Cnty. Tr. Co., 26 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Mass.
1940) (defining market price as “the highest price which a hypothetical willing buyer
would pay to a hypothetical willing seller in an assumed free and open market”).
6 See, e.g., Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The End of Bargaining in the Digital Age, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1469, 1470 (2018) (“Bargaining can be inefficient as well as costly, and it
is outdated. Law can improve efficiency and lower costs by reducing the bargaining power
of professional, well-informed parties.”).
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Our economic system of distribution and exchange is based primarily on
the concept of markets. This Part explores what markets do, how they work,
and how law shapes their structure and processes.
A. What Markets Do
Markets have a variety of definitions, depending on the purpose of the
characterization and the methodology used in developing it. The earliest
conception of a market was a physical place where commercial exchange
took place.7 But over time the “marketplace” evolved from a location to an
understanding of the transactions that took place within that space.8 A market could be described simply as a set of transactions that can be coherently
aggregated together.9 In the abstract, the concept has intuitive meaning, at
least for those who have participated in a variety of markets.10 But the concept can be used to describe the basic phenomena from multiple different
angles. A market is both a set of buyers and sellers for a particular good,
service, or property right, as well as the series of exchanges between these
buyers and sellers involving these goods, services, or rights.11 The term also
describes the legal, social, and economic structures that facilitate those
exchanges.12 A particular market can be defined by the types of goods or
7 Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Some Realism About Economic Power in a Time of Sectorial Change,
66 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 252 (1997) (“There was a time when market identified a physical
location—a place for exchange in relative safety from violent forms of acquisition, such as
plunder.”); Richard Swedberg, Max Weber’s Central Text in Economic Sociology, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC LIFE 62, 70 (Mark Granovetter & Richard Swedberg eds., 3d ed. 2011)
(“In describing the market, [Max] Weber says that the most obvious type of market is the
one that can be found in one specific place.”).
8 Peritz, supra note 7, at 252 (“Later, market came to represent a functional logic, a
form of exchange, regardless of physical location. Most recently, market has reflected an
abstract idea, an institutional framework whose shifting elements emerge from a series of
normative judgments.”).
9 More abstractly, a market is the potential for those transactions. See JOHN MCMILLAN, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS 5 (2002) (proposing that a
market for an item exists if there are people interested in buying and others interested in
selling it).
10 But see Pierre Schlag, Coase Minus the Coase Theorem—Some Problems with Chicago
Transaction Cost Analysis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 175, 216 (2013) (decrying “the lack of any robust
theoretical conception of the market in neoclassical economics”).
11 RICHARD G. LIPSEY, PETER O. STEINER & DOUGLAS D. PURVIS, ECONOMICS 216 (7th ed.
1984) (“From the point of view of a household, the market consists of those firms from
which it can buy a well-defined product; from the point of view of a firm, the market
consists of those buyers to whom it can sell a well-defined product.”); Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 71 (2007)
(noting that markets require a “mix of background conditions” including buyers and
sellers).
12 Christian Turner, The Segregation of Markets, 7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 299, 300–01 (2020)
(“Indeed, when we casually use the word ‘market,’ we do so to describe not the totality of
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services it covers, or in terms of geography, time, or kinds of participants. It
may encompass an entire economy, or be limited to one specific good.
The key to a market is the transaction: the exchange of one thing for
another. Markets allow for the exchange of goods, services, and other things
of value between parties.13 Because the nature of trade is to exchange nonsimilar items, there is a commensurability problem: the parties must judge
whether the one item (or set of items) should be traded for the other. For
this reason, most markets operate not on a barter system, but on a sales system in which money is exchanged for a good or service.14 Money addresses
the commensurability problem by creating a common unit of exchange that
can be applied in a variety of contexts.15 This common unit of exchange also
allows for the development of a common numerical value—a price—that
indicates the amount of commensurable value necessary for the exchange to
take place. To the extent that comparable things of value have been sold
within a certain period of time, there may be said to be a “market price” for
hypothetical sales of similar things.16
Markets are thus a way of distributing the resources of a society to various participants in that society.17 They are contrasted with other systems of
distribution, such as economic firms, government fiat, or tribal partitioning.18 As F.A. Hayek argued in The Use of Knowledge in Society, “[I]n a system
where the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people,
prices can act to coördinate the separate actions of different people in the
the attributes and activities of its participants but the mechanisms for their cooperation
regarding these decisions.”).
13 R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 7 (1988) (“Markets are institutions that exist to facilitate exchange, that is, they exist in order to reduce the cost of
carrying out exchange transactions.”).
14 Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1747, 1759 (1998) (“[M]arket choices are mediated through money, making commensurability much easier. We do not have problems of ‘comparing apples and oranges’ in many
market transactions because the choices almost always involve the purchaser’s surrendering money. Because the purchaser knows or could learn the market price of other goods
and services or can compute an opportunity cost, he can make a fairly accurate estimate of
the comparative worth of very different courses of action . . . .”).
15 Id. Money does not have to be commensurable across all values in order for markets to work; it only needs to be commensurable within the market. Incommensurability
may mean, however, that the particular item of value should not be distributed via a market. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 70 (1997) (arguing that
“human goods are not commensurable” across the board).
16 Cf. James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587, 1609–12 (1981) (discussing the role of “just price” in contractual formation).
17 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962) (stating that there are
“two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions”—“central direction involving the use of coercion” and “voluntary co-operation of individuals—the technique of the
market place”).
18 See Eckehard F. Rosenbaum, What Is a Market? On the Methodology of a Contested Concept, 58 REV. SOC. ECON. 455, 458 (2000) (developing “a definition that makes it possible to
identify markets empirically against the background of rival social forms such as firms,
central planning or occasional exchange transactions”).
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same way as subjective values help the individual to coördinate the parts of
his plan.”19 Because each individual buyer and seller in the market will look
to match price against their expected utility, transactions will only take place
if both parties think they will be better off for it. In this way exchanges are
guaranteed, in theory, to be Pareto efficient; both sides expect to increase
their utility as a result of the transaction.20 Because individuals would not
contract otherwise, the price will aggregate Pareto-efficient transactions and
will facilitate the appropriate distribution of precious resources.21
This system of voluntary exchange forms the cornerstone of modern
economic theory. The ever-familiar graph of supply and demand curves illustrates the equilibrium point at which a buyer’s demand for a particular good
will intersect with the seller’s supply.22 The maximizing behavior of both
sellers and buyers will result in a stable equilibrium, if conditions hold.23
And this equilibrium results in a maximization of social utility.24 Market
equilibrium ensures not only that the appropriate amount of a particular
resource is produced,25 but also that the good is optimally distributed to individuals within that society.26 Under mainstream economic principles, markets provide the best method for engaging the productive capacity of the
nation and distributing the nation’s resources to its inhabitants.27
Of course, this is economic theory. In real life, almost every market fails
to meet these required conditions for the efficient market hypothesis to hold
true; these conditions are idealized and are never met in totality. Concern
over the failure of reality to meet theoretical specifications has driven much
19 Hayek, supra note 2, at 526.
20 See Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive
Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265, 265 (1954) (offering an economic proof of this idea).
However, certain conditions—to be discussed in Section I.B—must be met for the market
to reach this result.
21 See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution,
78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 540 (2007) (“In our society, we generally answer ‘how much’
questions through the free market. According to standard neoclassical economic theory,
by aggregating individual preferences through innumerable voluntary exchanges, the
‘invisible hand’ of the free market produces economically ‘efficient’ levels of consumer
goods and services.”).
22 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 11 (3d ed. 2000) (“[T]here
is no habit of thought so deeply ingrained among economists as the urge to characterize
each social phenomenon as an equilibrium in the interaction of maximizing actors.”).
23 Id.; see also Sinden, supra note 21, at 541 (“[U]nder perfect conditions, the market
will reach an equilibrium point of Pareto efficiency—that is, a point at which there is no
alternative state of affairs that would be a Pareto improvement.”).
24 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 160–62.
25 Sinden, supra note 21, at 542 (discussing productive efficiency).
26 Id. at 542–43 (discussing allocative efficiency); see also Darren Bush, The “Marketplace
of Ideas:” Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote’s Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1113 (2000)
(“[T]he perfectly competitive market is said to be allocatively efficient.”).
27 See Bush, supra note 26, at 1114 (“The result of this rational, self-interested behavior
is a situation in which resources are allocated to their best possible use, goods are produced at their lowest possible cost, and innovations diffuse at their fastest possible rate.”).
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of the law and economics scholarship of the last half century. The Coase
Theorem, which initially may seem to counsel that parties will always bargain
for an efficient result no matter the existing legal rule, is actually an explanation of why transaction costs will prevent this from happening.28 Even if parties would bargain to reach the best result in a frictionless world, the world
has a lot of friction. Coase set out this description of transaction costs:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of
the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often
extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions
that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked
without cost.29

These costs can be so significant, thought Coase, that certain transactions are
removed from the market. Instead of allocating labor within a firm through
a market, the firm’s organizational hierarchy assigns the employee to a particular set of tasks. As Coase wrote: “If a workman moves from department Y
to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but
because he is ordered to do so.”30 The choice to manage economic choices
through a firm or through a market was, for Coase, dependent on which
choice made more sense when transaction costs were taken into account.
Even putting aside these perfect-market assumptions, however, market
economies have been famously criticized on their own terms. Basing a system of distribution on willingness and ability to pay raises significant problem
of commensurability, as markets commodify their resources into a system of
monetary exchange.31 All market systems have some transactions which are
deemed off limits—the resources are considered too dangerous (as in
drugs), too intimate (as in sex), or too valuable to individual life (as in organ
transplants) to be bought and sold. Distribution through markets also raises
concerns about the distribution of wealth, as the rich can pay much more for
an item than can the poor, regardless of underlying utility, resulting in dramatic distortions in distribution.32 Additional critiques include the potential
28 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–17 (1960).
29 Id. at 15.
30 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387 (1937); see also Coase,
supra note 28, at 16 (“As I explained many years ago, the firm represents such an alternative to organising production through market transactions.”).
31 SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 80 (“Incommensurability occurs when the relevant
goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered
judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”); Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987) (“[T]he characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis is morally wrong when it is put forward as the sole discourse of human
life.”).
32 See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 387, 425–30 (1981).
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for individuals to be mistaken about their actual welfare,33 as well as the
Marxist view on the inherent class struggle in any capitalist system.34
Whether markets are appropriate mechanisms to distribute resources
within a society is not a question that this Article intends to address. Rather,
assuming an economic system premised to a significant extent on markets,
we ask: What is the role that negotiation plays within markets? To do this, we
look more closely at how markets generally operate to distribute goods, services, and other things of value.
B. How Markets Work
The purpose of markets is to distribute things of value among members
of a society. Markets are mechanisms to insure the “best” allocation of
resources when those resources are scarce and must be divided in some way.
The most famous metaphor for the market’s work is Adam Smith’s “invisible
hand.”35 Smith argued that the force behind the hand is individual selfinterest, and that self-interest will lead to market transactions that will make
society better off.36 The power of Smith’s metaphor is that it conjures a
benevolent guide for individuals within the economy while at the same time
providing for individual freedom.
How, exactly, does this invisible hand work? The genius of markets—the
big, messy, crazy genius—is the myriad of individual, uncoordinated transactions that create it. Even if there seems to be a coherent intelligence leading
the market to a specific result, markets only truly work if there is the absence
of such a force. Each transaction must be made by the individual parties on
the merits, based on their judgment and circumstances, in order for the market to function.37 As Smith acknowledged, the messiness was a critical feature: “It is adjusted, however, not by any accurate measure, but by the
33 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1105, 1116 (2000); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive
and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 575 (1982).
34 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848),
reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 473, 473 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
35 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 304 (Liberty Classics 1976) (1759)
(“The rich . . . are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the
necessaries of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal
portions among all its inhabitants; and thus, without intending it, without knowing it,
advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.”).
36 See, e.g., James S. Wrona, False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act: Broad Consumer Protection Legislation or a Narrow Pro-Competitive Measure?, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 1085, 1093 n.15 (1995) (“Adam Smith’s hypothesis was that the laissez-faire
approach was the best way of allowing capitalism to prosper and that the theoretical ‘invisible hand,’ or rather the forces of competition, would guide the marketplace, allowing for
efficient allocation of resources.”).
37 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.2, at 6 (4th ed. 2004) (“Each party to an
exchange seeks to maximize its own economic advantage on terms tolerable to the other
party.”).
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higgling and bargaining of the market, according to that sort of rough equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business of common life.”38
For this vast gaggle of transactions to agglomerate into a market, we
need more than simply the transactions themselves. Looking more fundamentally, there must generally be a system of property which allows one person or entity to “own” a good or service that can then be sold to another.39 If
the person has no ownership rights over the thing in question—say, for
example, a private sale of the Brooklyn Bridge—then there could be no market distribution of that item. Relatedly, a market requires that the things
being exchanged are alienable—transferable from one to another. If an
item is inalienable—either through physical impossibility or the law or overriding social norms—then any purported market will ultimately not result in
lasting transfers.40 If these basics are in place such that one entity can provide one thing to another, in exchange for something else of value, then a
market can be said to exist.
Ownership rights in alienable goods are necessary but not sufficient for
a functional market. When we think of markets in our economy, we imagine
a more robust set of exchanges between a variety of parties in all manner of
goods, services, property rights, and other things of value.41 In order to facilitate those exchanges, markets generally have additional characteristics. Markets usually rely on a medium of exchange such as currency to facilitate the
transaction through the creation of a price. Market rules are enforced
through law, social practices, and/or the threat of violence.42 And there is
some avenue for redress if those rules are broken, either through law or private dispute resolution.43
In economic theory, markets operate to provide maximal efficiency in
the distribution of goods, services, and property rights. The suppliers in the
market will meet up and trade with the buyers on the market at the price that
works best for both parties—the equilibrium price. This price will reflect the
value that best matches buyers and sellers for that particular good at that
particular time. For this equilibrium to occur dependably for every transaction, a number of conditions must be met. Those conditions are generally
characterized within economics as: both parties are rational actors; both parties have perfect information; neither party has significant market power;
38 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 77 (P.F. Collier & Son 1902) (1776).
39 But see NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 16 (2016) (arguing that “markets can exist in the absence
of formal legal rules”).
40 See Radin, supra note 31, at 1850.
41 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 1.2, at 6 (“In a market economy, the terms of such
direct bilateral exchanges are arrived at voluntarily by the parties themselves through this
process of bargaining.”).
42 See OMAN, supra note 39, at 16 (arguing that “markets can exist in the absence of
formal legal rules”). But see SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 5.
43 OMAN, supra note 39, at 34–35 (noting that extralegal markets have some mechanism for enforcing agreements, even if an extended period of time is necessary).
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there are no significant and unaccounted-for externalities imposed on third
parties; and there are no transaction costs.44 If these conditions are met, this
perfectly competitive market will reach an equilibrium point of Pareto efficiency—that is, a point at which there is no alternative state of affairs that
would make both parties better off. This, in turn, will lead to overall societal
efficiency.
No market meets these exacting and theoretical specifications; moreover, each specification has spawned a rich academic literature on the difficulties caused by the failure of the condition. Behavioral economics and social
psychology have challenged the premise that individuals transact on a purely
rational basis.45 The problem of faulty information flows has been well documented and studied in a variety of contexts and markets, along with potential
remedies such as disclosure regimes.46 The field of antitrust is centered
around the problem of overbearing market power.47 The economic literature recognizes negative externalities such as pollution as well as positive
externalities such as education.48 And transaction costs have been central in
organizational economics and corporate law, particularly in the form of
agency costs.49 These imperfections have been fairly well chronicled by
important scholars in economics, law, and the wider social sciences. While
academics have intensively studied various market challenges like monopoly
power and disparate information, however, negotiation has been relatively
neglected.
This neglect stems from the underappreciated nature of markets as
transactions—markets as negotiations.50 Individual transactions form the
basis for markets. The relationships between these transactions are what
move a collection of individual bargains into a market. One aspect of the
relationship is competition, which is an integral aspect of markets. Sellers
compete with each other for sales, as do buyers; each individual is trying to
get the best deal while ensuring that the transaction takes place. The result44 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 160.
45 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
46 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970). On the potential remedy of mandated disclosure, see,
for example, OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 1, 10 (2014).
47 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 14 (noting that monopoly “inhibits effective freedom by denying individuals alternatives to the particular exchange”).
48 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 779–81 (1920); Kenneth J. Arrow, Social
Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL’Y 303, 303 (1973).
49 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 68 (1933); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976).
50 See OMAN, supra note 39, at 76 (“The economic analysis of law conceptualizes the
cost of bargaining as a waste of resources to be eliminated whenever possible. Taken to its
logical extreme, such a stance is deeply hostile to market processes.”).
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ing jockeying for position leads the market to equilibrium. Max Weber, for
example, said: “A market may be said to exist wherever there is competition,
even if only unilateral, for opportunities of exchange among a plurality of
potential parties.”51 Weber noted that markets facilitated exchange, which
required a “compromise of interests [between] the parties,” but also highlighted the role that competition—namely, a struggle or “haggling” between
the parties—plays as well.52
Our Article unearths the role of individual negotiating style, skills, and
method—what we will label “negotiation effectiveness”—for the law and economics literature on transactions. Just as some markets suffer from higher
information barriers than others, and other markets are more prone to concentrated power, some markets are more susceptible to the ways in which the
parties negotiate. Negotiated transactions are how markets work, and the
parties’ approaches to negotiation thereby play a role in the market.
Up to this point, only a few scholars have identified this gap in the literature. Saul Levmore and Frank Fagan have noted the absence of negotiation
analysis in the legal regulation of markets and have proposed efforts to
reduce its role in most transactions.53 Albert Choi and George Triantis consider the role of bargaining power on contract design, offering a perspective
on how bargaining power intersects with market theory to impact contract
terms.54 In their analysis, they suggest that bargaining power comprises five
factors: demand and supply conditions, market concentration, private information, patience and risk aversion, and finally, negotiating skills and strategy.55 Yet with respect to negotiation skills, they simply conclude that “skills
are the subject of many books on negotiation and we do not attempt to summarize them here.”56
Structural features of power in negotiation can be undermined and frustrated by effective negotiation strategy and tactics, as well as lack thereof;
features of a negotiation related to skill and ability are distinctly different and
should be taken seriously by scholars outside the field of negotiation. Before
moving more directly into our examination of negotiation in markets, we
first turn to the role of law in constructing markets.
C. The Construction and Regulation of Markets Through Law
There is a debate among scholars about the role of law in creating markets. In theory, a market can spring up in the absence of law. Trading has
taken place in the absence of legal systems for millennia, as there is even
51 MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 635
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968) (1921).
52 Id. at 38, 72.
53 Levmore & Fagan, supra note 6, at 1471 n.1 (“Economists recognize the waste in
search costs by consumers, but no one has come to grips with what this means for law.”).
54 Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98
VA. L. REV. 1665, 1667 (2012).
55 Id. at 1675.
56 Id. at 1677.
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evidence of the earliest humans engaging in exchange.57 However, markets
have always depended on some system of understandings, protections, and
methods of enforcement.58 Those rules—in our modern age—are best characterized as law.59
Law has several constitutive roles in the creation of markets. Property
rights endow rightsholders with the ability to transact over particular items,
whether they be goods, services, real estate, or ideas. The monetary system
provides a uniform currency for the conduct of trade and for the establishment of a common price. Criminal law and tort law protect property rights
by outlawing theft, trespass, nuisance, and destruction of property. And the
law of the transaction is contract law.
Contracts are defined by the process of exchange. As defined by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, “[T]he formation of a contract requires a
bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange
and a consideration.”60 There is a robust debate within the literature of contract law over whether contract theory is rooted in the idea of promise or the
idea of exchange.61 But the law has not followed the enforcement of
promises based on moral obligation.62 Instead, contract law remains rooted
in exchange.63
Contractual bargains are covered by a vast array of cases, statutes, regulations, ordinances, and other instantiations of law categorized under the
broad heading of “contract law.” The foundational premises for exchange
57 See OMAN, supra note 39, at 24.
58 To take one example from Oman’s book, ancient Carthaginian traders would sail
down the coast of Africa and lay their goods on beaches for locals to examine. They would
then withdraw to their ships. The Africans would lay ivory and gold next to the items, and
then withdraw themselves. If the trade was suitable to the Carthaginians, they would take
the offered items and leave; if not, they would take back their own items and leave.
Although this trading happened in the absence of law, there were obvious methods of
enforcement by both parties if one side tried to steal the other side’s goods without making
a payment. Id. at 34–35.
59 SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 5 (stating that “[f]ree markets depend for their existence on law” because law creates private property rights and the rules of contracting).
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 17(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
61 Compare CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1–2 (2d ed. 2015) (rooting contractual obligation in the rights of individuals to bind
themselves to future courses of action), with O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 462 (1897) (describing the concept of efficient breach).
62 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV.
708, 709–10 (2007) (“For instance, the moral rules of promise typically require that one
keep a unilateral promise, even if nothing is received in exchange. By contrast, contract
law only regards as enforceable promises that are exchanged for something or on which
the promisee has reasonably relied to her detriment.”).
63 O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 293–94 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881)
(“The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each
for the other, between consideration and promise.”).
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are set forth by the common law of contract, carried over from England.64
Common-law contract establishes the legal definition of a contract, which
requires a bargained-for exchange in which both sides exchange something
of value.65 The common law also establishes the other rules for contracting:
the interpretation of agreements,66 the defenses to contractual enforcement,67 and the remedies provided for contractual breach.68 This body of
contractual common law—specific to every state, but shared as a matter of
intellectual enterprise—governs transactions from beginning to end.
Along with the common law, innumerable other federal, state, and local
provisions make up the rules of exchange. Statutory and regulatory provisions place additional requirements on market transactions specific to certain industries, types of transactions, or characteristics of the parties. Just to
provide a few examples: securities regulations have very specific provisions
regarding the sale of corporate stock;69 drug laws require testing, disclosures,
and physician prescriptions for medicines and medical devices;70 and state
and federal licensing prohibits the sales of certain services, such as haircutting and lawyering, without certification of the seller’s competency.71 Every
possible market, it would seem, has a set of legal standards that apply specifically to that market and develop additional expectations for the parties that
participate in that market.
The role of law can vary significantly between markets: some are tightly
regulated, while others have a fairly loose set of legal specifications. The lowest common denominator of law will be the common law of contract, unless
statutorily erased; the highest common denominator depends on overlapping statutory, regulatory, and international regimes. Obviously, a comprehensive canvass across all markets would be impossible. But as we will
64 See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 5 (6th ed. 2003)
(“The mainstream of our law is that which evolved within the English common law tradition, encompassing mainly the decisions of common law courts . . . .”).
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 71(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.”).
66 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 7.1, at 413–14 (noting that contract interpretation
represents a substantial portion of contractual disputes and a significant body of law).
67 See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
67 (4th ed. 2001) (“[T]he law has traditionally regarded contracts as void or voidable if
made by persons lacking legal capacity, including ‘infants’ (generally, persons under 18),
drunks and the mentally ill, or if entered into under conditions of duress, or if induced by
fraud or misrepresentation.”).
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. §§ 344–77 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
69 See RICHARD W. JENNINGS, HAROLD MARSH, JR., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 99–110 (8th ed. 1998) (providing overview).
70 See, e.g., PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 239, 270–71 (2003); The History of FDA’s Fight for Consumer Protection and Public Health, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/history-fdas-fightconsumer-protection-and-public-health (June 29, 2018).
71 For a critique of occupational and business licensing, see DICK M. CARPENTER II,
LISA KNEPPER, ANGELA C. ERICKSON & JOHN K. ROSS, INST. FOR JUST., LICENSE TO WORK: A
NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 6 (2012).
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develop further, the law generally touches on but does not specifically
address or circumscribe the role of negotiation within most markets.
II. THE THEORY

OF

NEGOTIATION

IN

MARKETS

A. Negotiation and the Market
Many commonplace sales of goods and services rely on negotiation: most
retail car sales and home sales happen after some degree of negotiation
between the seller and the buyer,72 and many employment contracts are
negotiated as well.73 Similarly, the individual terms of legal settlements are
negotiated between lawyers.74 Yet for all of these settings, one can (and people often do) speak of market prices. There is undeniably a housing market,
a car market, a job market, and even a market for legal claims. These markets are neither monolithic fortresses nor sets of outcomes produced by cold,
passionless algorithm. Rather, they are markets that are made up of an
aggregation of individual, negotiated transactions. Each of these markets has
unique features that help to illuminate the chimerical nature of “market
price,” which may be nothing more than the outcome of the most recent or
prominent negotiated transaction between similarly situated parties.
Consider the market price for a house. If a neighbor recently sold her
house, and was a terrifically skilled negotiator, should her fantastic outcome
serve as a benchmark for the next house on the street? If a neighbor was
relocated suddenly, should a quick sale at a loss stand as the market price for
the rest of the block? Market price in this context may be conceptualized as
the latest relevant sale, or it might be wiser to consider, as many real estate
agents do, an average of all recent transactions so that one could arrive at a
price-per-square-foot figure.75 Nonetheless, even in the latter case, one can
see that the “market price” is merely an amalgamation of negotiated transac72 Stephen R. Barley, Why the Internet Makes Buying a Car Less Loathsome: How Technologies Change Role Relations, 1 ACAD. OF MGMT. DISCOVERIES 5, 10 (2015) (“Whereas Americans
readily pay the asking price for most goods, they expect to negotiate when purchasing a
car.”); Yuen Leng Chow, Isa E. Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, Auction Versus Negotiated Sale:
Evidence from Real Estate Sales, 43 REAL EST. ECON. 432, 432 (2015) (“[T]he dominant selling
mechanism for real estate is through brokered or negotiated sales.”).
73 Popular books touting skills for job negotiations abound. See, e.g., PETER J. GOODMAN, WIN-WIN CAREER NEGOTIATIONS: ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT NEGOTIATING YOUR
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (2001); TERRI R. KURTZBERG & CHARLES E. NAQUIN, THE ESSENTIALS OF JOB NEGOTIATIONS: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR GETTING WHAT YOU WANT (2011).
74 See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994). Certainly, not all transactions in the
marketplace rely on explicit negotiation. For example, when customers buy products such
as groceries or gasoline, they are rarely engaged in negotiation. While there may be negotiation at the outside edges of some of these basic consumer transactions, by and large the
critical negotiations that yield the relevant prices are conducted outside the influence of
the everyday customer.
75 Margaret Heidenry, What Is the Average Price per Square Foot for a Home—and Why Does
It Matter?, REALTOR (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.realtor.com/advice/buy/average-priceper-square-foot-for-a-home/.
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tions in the market. The averaging of the outcomes ought theoretically to
flatten the effects of any one terrifically skilled or unskilled negotiator on
either side, unless there is systematic disparity in negotiation behavior or
expertise by one side or the other.76
Given the interconnections between negotiated outcomes and market
prices, how do the two groups of scholars consider each other and their connection? Interestingly, the answer is that the groups rarely intersect with one
another beyond the superficial. From the negotiation side, markets come
into play mostly to provide a set of benchmarks for a particular transaction.
Roger Fisher and William Ury specifically highlight market price as one of
the suggested possible “objective criteria” in the seminal negotiation book
Getting to Yes.77 Fisher and Ury suggest that market price can be an important tool in being an effective negotiator; one powerful tactic can be to rely
on market price to provide an external benchmark supporting one’s
demands.78 Yet when one considers more closely what the idea of a market
price is, the picture becomes more complex. If market price dictates outcome, but past outcome dictates market price, where does that leave the current negotiator but at the whim of the past negotiators’ behavior?
Negotiation theorists often connect in this instrumental way to the idea
of the market—how market price or market features can impact the negotiation and an individual’s negotiation strategy—but rarely seem to consider the
broader implications of negotiations that rely on market pricing. Perhaps
this is because using market price as an objective criterion is the sole way that
most negotiation scholars think about markets. Similarly disengaged, in
turn, it is the rare market theorist who pauses to consider the express role of
negotiation behavior on market pricing.79
This is notable because negotiation theory and market theory in some
ways consider the same situation: What will the end price for a good or service be? In thinking about a particular transaction, market theory suggests
that rational economic actors will reach some type of equilibrium in pricing.
This equilibrium will be the market price and it in turn will eliminate much
of the struggle between both these and future parties over the division of
surplus. In contrast, negotiation literature often conceptualizes the negotiation process as a struggle over competing reservation prices, which are in
turn set by potentially vastly different “best alternatives to a negotiated agreement” (BATNAs) of the negotiating parties.80 Thus, the parties’ alternatives
76 Some markets are likely to exhibit exactly such a disparity, of course. Consider the
dread that many individuals feel when they are faced with a negotiation to buy a car. This
is often because of a perception that car salesmen are excellent at employing effective
negotiation tactics, while car buyers are rarely, on average, as skilled in that area. The
market price for a given car, then, is determined by an aggregation of negotiated outcomes
where the typical car dealer is more negotiation savvy than his buying counterpart.
77 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 85, 88–89 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
78 Id.
79 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 54, at 1687–88.
80 See FISHER & URY, supra note 77, at 97.
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dictate reservation prices, which creates a zone of possible agreement; like
two football teams, each negotiator attempts to drive the ball down the field
toward the other party’s end zone. The zone of possible agreement is a field
of surplus, which each party hopes to claim as much of as possible. The
BATNAs themselves may depend upon market prices for alternative solutions, but the BATNAs typically hold some degree of uncertainty involving
other factors, such as personal relationship effects and considerations of
other values that are important to a negotiator, including but not limited to
fairness, happiness, satisfaction, and effects on others.
Considering negotiation and market theory together paints a dynamic,
but also somewhat circular, process: indeed, it begins to look like a dog chasing its own tail. The aggregation of individual negotiations drives the market
price; the market price, in turn, plays a critical role in guiding individual
negotiation outcomes. These individual negotiation outcomes—back to
square one—are critical in defining market price.
B. Key Differences Between Market Theory Predictions and Negotiated Reality
The predominant vision of market exchange, grafted onto the negotiation context, suggests that any one bargain between individuals or entities
will look much like any other bargain between similarly situated parties. That
is, the structural components of the situation, being roughly equal, will produce similar outcomes across different parties’ interactions.
Negotiation scholars know that this is simply wrong. Giving the same
negotiation problem to a variety of different individuals produces an array of
vastly different results. These vastly different results cannot be explained by
information asymmetries. These differences in result mean that to the extent
that there is a “market,” one might speak more accurately of a market “array”
than a market price.81
In real-world settings, differences in outcome can be explained by a wide
range of variables, including information, knowledge, expertise, and custom.
Culture, personality, and risk preferences are but a few of the potential factors that may change the outcome of similarly situated negotiations. Economic models self-consciously simplify bargaining: as John Nash explained,
“In general terms, we idealize the bargaining problem by assuming that the
two individuals are highly rational, that each can accurately compare his
desires for various things, that they are equal in bargaining skill, and that
each has full knowledge of the tastes and preferences of the other.”82
Economics has moved away from the classic assumption of perfect information and is open to the inclusion of information asymmetry as an important component of bargaining theory.83 Yet this factor does not include
81 See supra Section II.A.
82 John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 155 (1950).
83 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Games Economists Play, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1821,
1827 (2000) (noting that “economists have done an excellent job analyzing prisoners’
dilemmas—situations involving information asymmetries, where the models (correctly)
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negotiating skill, or other factors that systematically affect negotiation outcomes, as explicit elements of bargaining theory. The time is ripe to do so
now. Because the market per se is in many cases likely to be an amalgamation of innumerable smaller negotiated exchanges whose outcome, each
individually, is guided in part if not in whole by negotiation behavior and
skill, faith in market pricing may be misguided with respect to both item or
service valuation and applicability to new parties.
Perhaps a key element of this analysis is that market price could refer
either to a particular previously negotiated outcome or the aggregate of a set
of all similar negotiations. Any one individual negotiator who gets a uniquely
“good” or “bad” deal should not set the market, per se; that outcome ought
to be only one data point in any definition of the market, taking “the market”
on its own theoretical terms.84 Anecdotally and empirically, there is ample
support for the notion that negotiated outcomes will span a wide range
across the zone of possible agreement. In data collected by Tyler and Hollander-Blumoff (2008),85 for example, outcomes from the same largely zerosum negotiation conducted by over 200 dyads yielded a distribution that
could largely be plotted in a straight line as follows:

predict that it will be difficult for participants to coordinate their efforts for mutual
benefit”).
84 Individual negotiators face the challenge of demonstrating that their own situation
is similar to, or distinguishable from, any given prior market negotiation; in this way, the
negotiator is similar to a litigator evaluating case precedent for its degree of relevance to
the case at hand.
85 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 478–79
(2008).
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In this negotiation, randomly paired dyads were given the same information, by side, and were disputing how much more work a contractor would
perform on a home project and how much more money the homeowner
would pay the contractor. As one can see from the graph, some homeowners
received a net benefit of approximately $15,000, while at least one homeowner suffered a net loss of $15,000 in the same circumstances. Similarly, at
least one contractor received a net benefit of over $15,000, while other contractors suffered a loss of over $10,000. Again, these outcomes all occurred
in the face of the same factual and legal setting, with the information known
by both parties held constant. The “market” for settlement in this case is
really a range of possible settlements, all of which represent a mutual agreement between parties.
What this data also helps to illustrate is that similarly situated parties will
negotiate the same problem very differently, and that outcomes must reflect
differences in negotiation dynamics, including effectiveness and skills,
because no other variables are systematically different across dyads. That is,
an application of economic and legal principles to the negotiation problem
at hand did not produce a unitary outcome; rather, the wide range of outcomes present here are not explicable by changes in legal endowments or
asymmetries of information. Nor can the range of outcomes be attributed
purely to chance. Instead, it is clear that some individuals are simply able to
negotiate a stronger agreement on behalf of their client, for a variety of reasons that will be explored more fully below.
C. Negotiation Effectiveness
There is no one definition of a successful negotiator. Some law and economics–based scholars point to information86 and/or bargaining power87 as
the driving force in negotiation success, but other factors play a critical role
in guiding negotiation outcome. Information and power are appealing factors to highlight because they appear, at least on their face, to be quantifiable
or discernable, while factors around negotiation skill, talent, and ability
remain frustratingly opaque.
Although there is rarely any question as to whether information is useful
during negotiation,88 there is an important distinction between having infor86
87

See Choi & Triantis, supra note 54, at 1701–12.
See Russell Korobkin, On Bargaining Power, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE
DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 251–56 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
88 There are, of course, unique circumstances in which ignorance can be helpful to
one’s side. For example, in an anecdote described by Schelling, one downed airman can
gain the upper hand over another downed airman in negotiations over which man should
attempt to traverse dangerous terrain to find the other, simply by transmitting his own
location and then destroying his radio. His ignorance of the other airman’s position, coupled with the other airman’s awareness of such ignorance, actually helps him to achieve his
aim of forcing the other man to come to him. Similarly, complete ignorance about a
particular topic may allow a negotiator to ask for something in apparent good faith that is
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mation and having negotiation ability. The relationship is dynamic; it is true
that very good negotiators often have a great deal of information. However,
individuals who are good negotiators may engage in preparation that
includes the actual gathering of information prior to negotiation: that is,
good negotiators make it their business to seek out relevant information
before entering into negotiation.89 Part of what makes them effective is that
they build up information, perhaps even to the point of information asymmetry. This asymmetry is not inherent or inevitable to the role. During the
negotiation process, good negotiators will use information strategically, as
well as continue to gather information throughout the negotiation. But
again, information itself, per se, cannot fully account for the observed differences in negotiation outcomes among parties that are similarly situated, a
result often found in negotiation studies where parties are given the same
consistent information by side.90
Another potential source of negotiation effectiveness is bargaining
power. As noted above, Choi and Triantis, considering the role of such
power in the design of contracts, suggest that bargaining power can be broken down into five factors: demand and supply conditions, market concentration, private information, patience and risk aversion, and finally, negotiating
skills and strategy.91 Note that here, Choi and Triantis subsume the possession of useful information into a broader category of power.92 And Choi and
Triantis do suggest that bargaining power contains at least one element that
depends upon the unique behavior of the individual negotiator.93 Without
good negotiation skills and strategy, they imply, structural power on paper
might go begging.94
Russell Korobkin has posited, more simply, that one’s BATNA is what
dictates who has power during a negotiation.95 However, Korobkin quickly
clarifies that what is really meaningful in such a setting is perceptions of one’s
own and others’ BATNAs, and a key feature of such perception is one’s ability to persuade and influence another party into believing that your BATNA
is what you say it is. Thus, it is not “absolute” power that is meaningful; it is
perceptions of power that are critical in determining how negotiation
unfolds.96 Thus, Korobkin concludes, power is derived from persuasive
completely outside the bounds of reason or possibility, and she may gain an advantage
through doing so. Just as easily, however, she may signal a lack of credibility or suggest that
there is no potential zone of possible agreement between the parties and this may prevent
any negotiated outcome. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 58–59 (1980).
89 See Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing,
68 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 28, 29–30 (1978).
90 See supra text accompanying notes 84–85.
91 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 54, at 1675.
92 Id.
93 See id. at 1675–77.
94 See id.
95 See Korobkin, supra note 87, at 252–53.
96 Id. at 253–54.
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behavior: in other words, negotiation skill.97 What both Korobkin and Choi
and Triantis note, but in varying degrees of foregrounding, is that so-called
structural features of negotiation such as information and power are only
useful to the degree that the negotiator makes them useful. That is, an individual’s negotiation behavior—their negotiation acumen and talent—is a significant driver of both information acquisition and negotiation power and,
therefore, of negotiation outcome.
One consideration as we contemplate what factors make individuals successful negotiators is how to define success in negotiation at all. There are
many critical components to a successful negotiation. Economic outcome is,
of course, one of the paramount goals, but other important goals may
include durability of an agreement, satisfaction with nonmonetary terms, a
belief in the distributive justice (outcome fairness) of the agreement, and
subjective versus objective value.98 Research has also suggested that people
care about being treated fairly during the negotiation process.99 The task of
defining a good outcome is not an easy one, but for our purposes here we
too will necessarily simplify: we largely interpret good outcome to mean the
highest economic benefit.
What factors might be included in negotiation ability? Our purpose
here is not to offer a dispositive portrait of the skilled negotiator, but rather
to gather in one place, briefly, some of the potential factors that can lead a
negotiator to better outcomes than others. The factors that form the array of
effective negotiation behavior are wide-ranging and complex. Beyond simply
considering information and power, negotiation scholars and teachers use
analytical frameworks that include styles, strategy, tactics, and skills. Subsumed within these frameworks are considerations that include but are not
limited to: deception, communication, awareness and use of one’s own and
others’ cognitive biases, awareness of integrative versus distributive potential,
an understanding of relationships, listening skills, awareness and navigation
of cultural issues, emotional intelligence, perspective-taking, and dealing
with difficult people or tactics.
The question of what makes a negotiator effective is complicated, beginning with the most fundamental question of conceptualization of the process. The negotiation literature is divided between those who believe the
most successful negotiators are sharp, tough, competitive, and often without
scruples, and those who believe in a collaborative, “principled,” or problemsolving approach to negotiation. The debate between these camps is more
theoretical than empirical, with legions of “how-to” books, articles, and
97 See id. at 251–52.
98 Jared R. Curhan, Hillary Anger Elfenbein & Gavin J. Kilduff, Getting off on the Right
Foot: Subjective Value Versus Economic Value in Predicting Longitudinal Job Outcomes from Job Offer
Negotiations, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 524, 529 (2009); Jared R. Curhan, Hillary Anger Elfenbein
& Noah Eisenkraft, The Objective Value of Subjective Value: A Multi-Round Negotiation Study, 40
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 690, 703–05 (2010).
99 See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 85, at 473.
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courses advocating for variants of these approaches.100 Often, assertions
about negotiation effectiveness have grounding in the anecdotal or the “common-sensical” voice of the author, without reference to data or research.101
Ironically, negotiation processes are also simultaneously among the most
studied of psychological interactions, so no shortage of data exists about
negotiation behavior and its effects.102 However, because the scope of negotiation behavior is so very broad—a field that can include nuclear disarmament, small claims settlement, salary determination, and where to eat dinner
is by definition highly variegated—the mixed signals and vast scope of the
data can be daunting to distill into simple messages. A review of the literature suggests that effective negotiation behavior’s antecedents can be tied to
at least four large clusters: strategy and tactics, individual differences, training, and external bias.
1. Strategy and Tactics
In the broadest terms, negotiation strategy is often conceptualized as
either competitive or cooperative, distributive or integrative, positional or
principled, and so on, with the former of each of these viewing negotiation as
a more hostile battle for resources in which a gain for one party yields a loss
for the other, and the latter of each of these focusing more on shared interests and expansion of the so-called negotiation “pie.”103 Of course, strategies
may also be a mix between these approaches. Because negotiation is a
dynamic and highly contextual process, choosing which approach to employ
in any particular engagement is important to negotiation success.
Tactics include the specific behaviors that one chooses to use to implement one’s strategies. Tactics can include processes and decisions as diverse
as truth telling versus falsity, social value orientation, perspective taking and
empathy, opening offers, the use of psychological heuristics and biases, particular use of communication, and nonverbal behaviors, just to name a few.
A host of particular tactics and behaviors has been tested in the negotiation context to determine whether certain behaviors are more or less effective in yielding better negotiation outcomes. Studies have used experimental
manipulations to determine how inducing certain mindsets or behaviors
affect negotiation outcome.104 Findings are varied and provide an almost
kaleidoscopic perspective on what makes a negotiator effective. For example,
100 Books Received, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1099, 1099 (1994) (reviewing ROGER FISHER,
ELIZABETH KOPELMAN & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR COPING WITH CONFLICT (1994)).
101 See e.g., Donald C. Farber, Common-Sense Negotiation: How to Win Gracefully, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1987, at 92, 92–93; Barbara L. Rosenfeld, Negotiating Tips from a Master, L.A. L., May
2007, at 52, 52.
102 See generally Leigh L. Thompson, Jiunwen Wang & Brian C. Gunia, Negotiation, 61
ANN. REV. PSYCH. 491 (2010).
103 See generally Willem F.G. Mastenbroek, Negotiating: A Conceptual Model, 5 GRP. & ORG.
STUD. 324 (1980).
104 See discussion infra subsection II.C.4.
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individuals may be more or less skilled at revealing or concealing information, or at eliciting accurate information from the other side, as discussed
earlier.105 But individuals may also begin with different opening positions or
offers that are more or less beneficial to their side. They may be better or
worse communicators, or more skilled in the art of persuading others to see
their side.106 They may engage in nonverbal or verbal behavior that promotes liking by the other side, which can be beneficial to the ultimate outcome.107 They may be particularly skilled in persuading others to use an
integrative rather than a distributive bargaining structure, or vice versa. In
addition, some negotiators may be able to employ lessons from social psychology on decision-making heuristics and biases to benefit from exploiting
phenomena including anchoring, framing, overconfidence, and more, while
other negotiators may suffer pitfalls from these same features of
negotiation.108
2. Individual Differences
The role of individual differences, rather than specific behavior, has
been controversial in the negotiation field. Some believe that individual differences are not systematically related to outcome differences in negotiation,
and others have long repeated this conclusion.109 And, as with all negotiation processes, the dynamic nature of the interaction adds a layer of complexity on top of what individual difference factors will or will not lead to
effective negotiation, because at least two people’s individual differences are
involved.
Nonetheless, more recent research has begun to challenge the paradigm
that individual differences don’t matter. One meta-analysis, for example,
found that individual level variables including cognitive and emotional intelligence had significant effects on negotiation outcome, and all of the “Big
Five” personality variables with the exception of conscientiousness had a significant effect on noneconomic negotiation variables.110 The extent to
105 See discussion infra Section II.C.
106 For example, one study found that negotiators do better when they use language
that is less extreme in making requests. See generally Yossi Maaravi, Orly Idan & Guy Hochman, And Sympathy Is What We Need My Friend—Polite Requests Improve Negotiation Results,
PLOS ONE, Mar. 13, 2019, at 1, e0212306, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0212306.
107 See Daniel Druckman & Benjamin J. Broome, Value Differences and Conflict Resolution:
Familiarity or Liking?, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 571, 591 (1991); Jennifer S. Mueller & Jared R.
Curhan, Emotional Intelligence and Counterpart Mood Induction in a Negotiation, 17 INT’L J.
CONFLICT MGMT. 110, 122 (2006).
108 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 795, 797–98 (2004).
109 Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Jared R. Curhan, Noah Eisenkraft, Aiwa Shirako & Lucio
Baccaro, Are Some Negotiators Better than Others? Individual Differences in Bargaining Outcomes,
42 J. RSCH. PERSONALITY 1463, 1463–64 (2008).
110 See Sudeep Sharma, William P. Bottom & Hillary Anger Elfenbein, On the Role of
Personality, Cognitive Ability, and Emotional Intelligence in Predicting Negotiation Outcomes: A
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which these characteristics are immutable across situations versus subject to
variation with a particular situation may also affect the way that these differences play out in particular negotiations; negotiation counterparts who can
manipulate certain personality dimensions to their own ends may be more
successful than others who are relatively uninterested in those dimensions or
less adept at navigating or shaping them.
Another individual-level difference variable that may influence negotiation outcome is social value orientation (SVO). Social value orientation
describes the baseline orientation of an individual toward the allocation of
resources.111 Social value orientation may be proself or prosocial, with social
science meta-analyses suggesting that the population is roughly split between
preference for outcomes that are proself (either competitive, meaning that
individuals want to “win” in their interactions with others, or individualistic,
meaning that they have a desire for the highest outcome possible for themselves, without reference to the other party’s results) or prosocial (with a
strong desire to divide resources equally, and also perhaps to expand the
“pie” as much as possible).112 Although psychologists sometimes refer to
SVO as a personality variable, it is a personality variable that is highly affected
by social cues.113 Thus, context can lead individuals to act more in accordance with one SVO than another, depending on the message sent by that
context.114 A good negotiator, then, may be able to shape the other party’s
SVO through cues and messaging in a way that benefits her own outcome. A
good negotiator may also be able to choose her own most beneficial SVO and
resist external efforts to change it.115
Yet another individual-level difference relates to consideration of distributive fairness in negotiation. As decades of research on the ultimatum game
has shown, some individuals will routinely reject outcomes that are economiMeta-Analysis, 3 ORG. PSYCH. REV. 293, 293 (2013). For additional empirical results, see
generally Sudeep Sharma, Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Jeff Foster & William P. Bottom, Predicting Negotiation Performance from Personality Traits: A Field Study Across Multiple Occupations,
31 HUM. PERFORMANCE 145 (2018).
111 For a more detailed overview of research on social value orientation, see Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff, Social Value Orientation and the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 475
(2017).
112 Id. at 489, 491.
113 Id. at 494.
114 For example, in one study, individuals playing a prisoner’s dilemma game were
more cooperative when told that the game was called the Community Game, and more
competitive when told that the game was called the Wall Street Game, even though the
actual rules of the game were identical. Varda Liberman, Steven M. Samuels & Lee Ross,
The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations Versus Situational Labels in Determining
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1175, 1178, 1182
(2004).
115 For example, a negotiator who can persuade her opponent to be prosocial—to
believe that an even distribution of resources is appropriate—may be effective in gaining
more than she might otherwise, but a negotiator who chooses to be individualistic in the
face of efforts to change frame may be able to claim more of the surplus for herself. Of
course, these scenarios are highly context dependent.
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cally favorable to them if those outcomes do not comport with fairness
norms, while other individuals will not.116 This is particularly important for
two reasons. First, it suggests that good negotiators should learn about the
other side’s fairness preferences, because if you are negotiating with someone who is willing to take any economically beneficial outcome regardless of
fairness, you can set your sights much higher (or lower, as the case may be)
than you might otherwise be able to.117 Second, negotiators who can shape
other people’s perceptions of fairness, and persuade others that their proposed outcome provides the level of fairness that is desired, will be able to
enjoy more success at the negotiation table.
In addition, procedural fairness (procedural justice) has also been
found to influence perceptions about negotiation outcome, with individuals
who believe they have received a negotiated outcome through a fair process
perceiving those outcomes as more likely to lead to a durable agreement.118
Thus, individuals’ differences in sensitivity to process fairness may also play a
role in providing individual-level variation in willingness to agree to certain
outcomes. In addition, negotiators who can master the art of ensuring that
their negotiation counterparts feel that the process is fair may have an advantage in negotiating successfully.
Some research has found that negotiators receive better results when
they have a choice mindset—that is, they focus more on the idea that individuals face choices rather than constraints.119 Although this study manipulated individuals’ frame of mind, in the real world of negotiation, whether
someone approaches a negotiation with the belief that they are constrained
or not may rest on underlying individual differences as well.
Finally, although it is not an individual-level difference, cultural differences in negotiation style may play a role in guiding the outcome of negotiations.120 Although documenting the vast effects of cultural differences is
116 Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 383–84 (1982); Martin A. Nowak, Karen
M. Page & Karl Sigmund, Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCI. 1773, 1773
(2000) (noting that the ultimatum game “has inspired dozens of theoretical and experimental investigations”); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, J. ECON.
PERSPS., Fall 1988, at 195, 205.
117 Interestingly, this kind of negotiation effectiveness relates to information acquisition—but it is a different kind of information acquisition than contemplated by economists and legal scholars, relating not to substantive information about the subject matter of
the negotiation but instead to the specific characteristics of the other parties to the
negotiation.
118 Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 85, at 493–94.
119 Anyi Ma, Yu Yang & Krishna Savani, “Take It or Leave It!” A Choice Mindset Leads to
Greater Persistence and Better Outcomes in Negotiations, ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES, July 2019, at 1, 11 (individuals who were induced to focus on choices rather
than constraints perceived greater room to negotiate, demonstrated more persistence in
the face of ultimatums, and received better outcomes in negotiation).
120 See, e.g., Michael W. Morris & Michele J. Gelfand, Cultural Differences and Cognitive
Dynamics: Expanding the Cognitive Perspective on Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 45–54 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004).
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outside the scope of this project, it is worth noting that those who are better
able to navigate their own and others’ cultural identity at the negotiation
table will gain a benefit.
3. Training
While some more essential individual differences are related to negotiation performance, evidence also suggests that negotiation is a skill that can
be taught. Indeed, some negotiation training specifically targets for growth
and development particular individual differences that have been linked to
good outcomes. For example, emotional intelligence can, to some degree,
be improved through effort.121 Other negotiation training focuses on teaching the kinds of strategies and tactics that have been found effective in social
science research, or focuses on sharing the insights about human behavior,
especially decision-making behavior, to individuals who could use that information to their benefit in negotiation.122
There is significant debate over what best practices in negotiation training are, with respect to both content and pedagogy. For example, some
negotiation teachers focus on teaching a more win-lose style of negotiation.123 Others adopt a stance geared toward a more collaborative or principled type of negotiation.124 A debate has long existed between these
negotiation teaching “camps.”125
Different kinds of learning processes have also been studied. Individuals
can improve negotiation performance through a variety of types of training,
including analogy and observation.126 Of particular interest, those who
believe that negotiation is a skill that can be deepened are more likely to do
better in negotiation than those who believe negotiation is an innate abil121 JAMIL ZAKI, THE WAR FOR KINDNESS: BUILDING EMPATHY IN A FRACTURED WORLD 15,
27–32 (2019).
122 See supra note 110.
123 See, e.g., James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RSCH. J. 926, 926–27 (describing negotiation as a mostly zero-sum
proposition in which lying and manipulation are the order of the day).
124 FISHER & URY, supra note 77, at 86–88; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View
of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 784–85 (1984).
125 Although the principled, collaborative, problem-solving approach promulgated by
Fisher, Ury, Menkel-Meadow, and others, see supra notes 77, 123–24, has come to be dominant in academic settings, that ascendancy has been rattled and challenged by the popularity and recent victories by Donald Trump. See G. Richard Shell, Transactional Man:
Teaching Negotiation Strategy in the Age of Trump, 35 NEGOT. J. 31, 32–33 (2019) (reviewing
MARTIN E. LATZ, THE REAL TRUMP DEAL: AN EYE-OPENING LOOK AT HOW HE REALLY NEGOTIATES (2018)).
126 Elizabeth Chapman, Edward W. Miles & Todd Maurer, A Proposed Model for Effective
Negotiation Skill Development, 36 J. MGMT. DEV. 940, 941 (2017); Jeffrey Loewenstein & Leigh
L. Thompson, Learning to Negotiate: Novice and Experienced Negotiators, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 77, 77 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006); Janice Nadler, Leigh Thompson
& Leaf Van Boven, Learning Negotiation Skills: Four Models of Knowledge Creation and Transfer,
49 MGMT SCI. 529, 530 (2003).
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ity.127 In any event, negotiation effectiveness can be bolstered by access to
and participation in training programs.
4. External Bias
In addition, perhaps critically relevant to law, research suggests that
beyond the issue of individual negotiation “skill,” negotiations may unfold
differently depending on the identity of the parties. That is to say, issues of
systemic or individual bias may play a significant role in shaping outcomes,
regardless of skill or ability of the negotiator, thereby affecting and inhibiting
or amplifying some negotiators’ capacity for effectiveness. For example,
when women and minorities systematically receive lower initial offers from
their negotiation counterparts, when women face negative consequences
after negotiating, and when some individuals choose not to negotiate in
order to maintain positive relationships, it becomes clear that systematic
biases may creep (or march) into the market system by way of negotiated
transactions.
Research from Pew found a significant wage gap in 2015 among college
graduates with different demographic identities.128 For example, collegeeducated African American and Hispanic men, as well as white and Asian
college-educated women, earned roughly 80% of what their white male counterparts earned.129 African American and Hispanic women earned about
70% of the white male wage.130 While not all of the gaps may be attributed
to negotiation behavior, the gaps do point out an immediate concern with
market price—there appears to be a different “market price” for different
groups. This differential outcome may, though, also stem from significant
differences in negotiation behavior on the part of negotiating pairs.
For example, in 1995, Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman sent individuals
into car dealerships to assess whether men and women and white and African
American individuals would be presented with different opening offers for
their purchase of the same car.131 For the initial offers, the range of profit
that would accrue to the dealer varied widely depending on the sex and race
of the purported purchaser.132 The salesmen gave white men an offer that,
on average, would provide $1019 in profit to the dealer, while white women
received an offer that provided $1127 in profit to the dealer.133 In contrast,
offers to African American purchasers provided $1337 (women) and $1954
127 Laura J. Kray & Michael P. Haselhuhn, Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Performance:
Experimental and Longitudinal Evidence, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 49, 50 (2007).
128 Eileen Patten, Racial, Gender Wage Gaps Persist in U.S. Despite Some Progress, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (July 1, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-genderwage-gaps-persist-in-u-s-despite-some-progress/.
129 Id.
130 Asian men earned slightly more than white men. Id.
131 See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a
New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 305–07 (1995).
132 See id. at 308
133 Id.
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(men) profit to the dealer.134 Thus, the range of the opening offer for this
car, representing the range of opening offers on the market, varied by
$935—a not inconsiderable amount that represents a 92% increase in profit
for dealers.135
Of course, these are just opening offers, and represent only one side of
the negotiation. However, not only does literature suggest the power of
opening offers during negotiation,136 but the Ayres and Siegelman study
itself explores this question. Even though all participants in the study followed a common script, the final offers by the dealer span an even greater
range: final offers received by white men (profit to dealer of $564) were far
lower than final offers received by African American men ($1665).137 African American men’s offers represented a profit for dealers 200% higher than
for the offers those dealers gave to white men. While these findings do not
address negotiation skill per se, because the study participants were sent in
with identical scripts, they do suggest that certain groups may have a more
difficult hurdle to overcome in negotiation, regardless of their negotiation
abilities.
In another notable study, Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever traced a
large part of the disparities in salaries between men and women to the markedly higher tendency among men to negotiate starting salary offers.138 This
is yet another way that negotiable transactions may have vastly different
results; part of the skillset of a talented negotiator is knowing when there is a
potential for increasing the value of a transaction through negotiating. Babcock and others’139 work suggests that there is a threshold question about
outcomes to consider when thinking about market pricing: Has the transaction been negotiated, or not? The nonnegotiated market price and the
negotiated market price may differ meaningfully.
When a so-called negotiation skill—knowing when there is a possibility
of increasing one’s outcome through negotiation—is distributed unevenly
and systematically across populations, this may suggest a problematic feature
of market pricing. But even more troubling, some empirical research has
suggested that women’s “failure to negotiate” may not reflect a lack of negotiation skill at all. Instead, this research has suggested that women who do
negotiate may face a backlash effect, rendering a decision not to negotiate
more explicable and perhaps more economically understandable in the long134 Id.
135 See id.
136 Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role of PerspectiveTaking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 657, 657–58 (2001).
137 Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 131, at 308.
138 LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 1–3 (2003).
139 See id.; see also Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Lei Lai, Social Incentives for
Gender Differences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 89–91 (2007); Andreas Leibbrandt & John A.
List, Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment,
61 MGMT. SCI. 2016, 2017 (2015).
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term. Some research has found that women who engaged in a salary negotiation were rated as more unlikable than nonnegotiators, and that their negotiation counterparts were more likely to say that they would not want to work
with them in the future.140 Thus, the “failure to negotiate” may actually
reflect a rational and considered decision by women in some situations;
nonetheless, lack of negotiation results in a lower market price for women in
the workplace. This provides women in salary negotiations with a set of loselose options in terms of “skill” in negotiation.
In addition, the dynamic nature of negotiation means that even skilled
negotiators’ outcomes may differ because of the behavior of their negotiation
counterpart. Recent research indicated that women who negotiated with
men holding stronger stereotype beliefs regarding gender did worse in negotiation than women who negotiated with men who did not hold, or held less
strongly, such beliefs.141
Another recent study considered the role of race in salary negotiation,
seeking to explore reasons for the racial wage gap.142 The study posits that
stereotypes about African Americans help to create a backlash effect for job
seekers who do engage in negotiation. The researchers specifically invoke
“the market,” hypothesizing that job evaluators who are more racially biased
“will hold expectancies consistent with racial stereotypes that consign Black
job seekers to lower estimations of market value (i.e., starting salary) and
therefore, perceive them as less likely to negotiate.”143 The researchers further hypothesize that when African Americans do negotiate, they will
encounter negative results because, “[a]lthough there is generally nothing
negative about negotiating one’s salary, the application of a prescriptive stereotype to Black negotiators (i.e., they do not deserve to negotiate for higher
salaries) can produce negative salary outcomes when these individuals do not
conform.”144 Participants who had less explicit bias believed that the white
and African American negotiators negotiated about the same amount.145 In
addition, the study found that an increase in negotiation behavior by an African American negotiator corresponded to a decrease in ultimate salary: African Americans were penalized for negotiating.146
Research including the studies discussed above, taken together, suggest
several important features of the market. First, the market is not fully dictated by legal endowments, a paradigm that has been popular among law and
140 See Bowles et al., supra note 139, at 89–91.
141 Vaani Pardal, Madeliene Alger & Ioana Latu, Implicit and Explicit Gender Stereotypes at
the Bargaining Table: Male Counterparts’ Stereotypes Predict Women’s Lower Performance in Dyadic
Face-to-Face Negotiations, 83 SEX ROLES 289, 289, 301 (2020).
142 Morela Hernandez, Derek R. Avery, Sabrina D. Volpone & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Bargaining While Black: The Role of Race in Salary Negotiations, 104 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 581, 581
(2019).
143 Id. at 582.
144 Id. at 583.
145 Id. at 585.
146 Id. at 587.
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economics scholars for decades.147 Additionally, markets are not fully dictated by limits on information or available information; in these settings
described above, all parties were privy to the same information. Finally, markets are not fully dictated by structural elements of power, such as the inherent power of being a seller or a buyer, or employee or employer, in a given
setting. Because this range of outcomes represents what happens in a given
setting, this highlights, again, that “market price” must be conceptualized as
a range or set of outcomes that may vary widely on the individual level.
These differences in market price even within conceptually unified markets suggest that including negotiating effectiveness in market parameters
will help to capture some of this variation. In considering how much weight
to place on the role of negotiation effectiveness, it would be useful to understand what markets have high and what markets have low negotiation variability; as noted above, the market for buying bread at the grocery store is
likely to have low variability, but the market for cars appears to have fairly
high variability. An examination of the role that negotiating skill and effectiveness may occupy in determining outcomes suggests that the law may play
a critical role in addressing inequalities, going beyond simply information
deficits and traditional conceptions of structural power.
III. NEGOTIATION VARIANCE WITHIN MARKETS
Now that we have identified the “variable” of negotiation skill and ability,
how should we apply this variable in our study and regulation of markets?
Markets are not uniformly sensitive to negotiation. Some markets will have
little to no negotiation within them, while others will be very sensitive to fluctuations based on negotiating ability.148 The importance of negotiation to a
particular market varies based on many factors. The following is an effort to
create a taxonomy of negotiation variance within markets, based on work in
law, sociology, and economics, that can be used as an initial guide to variance.149 We focus on: (a) the characteristics of the transaction subject; (b)
the structure of the market; and (c) the norms of the market.

147 The idea that legal endowments are critical in dictating the course of a negotiation
is highlighted in Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968–69 (1979), and in numerous articles that
followed.
148 See Peter Martin Jaworski & Jason Brennan, Market Architecture: It’s the How, Not the
What, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 232 (2015) (“Some markets have a fixed price, like at
your local Walmart. Other markets have prices that you are expected to haggle over, like
at a garage sale.”).
149 Our breakdown of transaction characteristics, structure of the market, and norms of
the market, is based on Patrik Aspers’s three prerequisites for an ordered market: (1) what
the market is about, (2) how things are done in the market, and (3) determining the
economic worth of the offer. See PATRIK ASPERS, MARKETS 92–100 (2011).
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A. Characteristics of the Transaction Subject
The “transaction subject” is the item that is being bought and sold in the
market, whether it be a good, a service, real property, intellectual property,
legal rights, or some combination thereto. The nature of the subject of the
transaction will influence whether there is room for negotiation over the
terms of the deal. Perhaps the most obvious factor is the uniqueness of the
item. The more unique, rare, or uncommon the item is, the more likely
there will be difficulty in precisely pricing it. Because markets first turn to
comparator sales to form a basis of market price, the absence of relatively
similar comparators will leave the parties looking to second-order principles
in pricing. These subsidiary aspects of the item—its cost, the sum of value for
its individual components, or its value to the buyer—are less determinable or
less known to both parties, and therefore make the transaction more
negotiable.
Relatedly, the “elasticity” of a particular market will affect negotiability.
Elasticity—or more specifically, the price elasticity of demand—refers to the
extent to which the quantity of a particular transaction subject demanded by
buyers responds to a price change.150 The following factors are thought to
determine the elasticity of demand: the importance of the item to the buyer,
whether the item is a necessity or luxury, whether there are adequate substitutes for the item, and whether a buyer can switch into another category
item, and how quickly.151 A medical drug that is necessary for the buyer’s
continued survival and that has no substitute would be inelastic as to that
buyer.152 On such an item, the buyer is likely to pay very high amounts—in
this case, all of their discretionary income beyond the other needs for survival—to obtain the item. As a result, the seller has significant negotiation
power. Similar inelasticity may arise in situations where common but necessary goods have experienced a supply shock—say, potable water in the aftermath of a natural disaster. In such cases, sellers have temporary but
extraordinary negotiation power as these items will be in extremely high
demand, and there is, because of the circumstances, a severely constricted
(or nonexistent) set of alternatives.153
Along these lines, sociologist Patrik Aspers has drawn a distinction
between standard markets and status markets.154 In standard markets, the
item itself can stand separate and apart from the individual identities of the
sellers and buyers; most markets for fungible goods or raw materials would
fall into this category.155 Status markets, on the other hand, are ranked by
the status of their participants, such that the more elite producers can
150 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 65–66, 671.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., Gregory R. Kirsch, Hurricanes and Windfalls: Takings and Price Controls in
Emergencies, 79 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1235–38 (1993).
154 ASPERS, supra note 149, at 88.
155 Id. at 89.
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demand more for their products.156 Goods such as designer-label clothing,
while commodities to some extent, fall within status markets because buyers
take the status of the seller into account when making the purchase. Standard markets are likely to have lower negotiation variance, as their sale items
must on some level be fungible between participants, leading to lower variance between contractual sales. Because status markets take identity and
social station into account, their value is harder to quantify and thus leaves
open more room for variance as to terms.
The quality and quantity of information available about the item also
influences its negotiability. Akerlof’s “market for ‘lemons’ ” illustrates the
instability of a market with highly variable quality along with poor information as to that quality.157 Negotiation skills can fill the gap in information
with persuasion, guile, and even irrelevant or misleading entreaties, as long
as it does not cross the line into misrepresentation. The nature of the available information matters as well, as quantifiability of quality reduces the role
of negotiation. If the item being sold can be valued according to a specific
metric, such as carats for diamonds or karats for gold, prices can sort themselves along the metric with less need for bargaining. There are also quantifiable metrics that are based on qualitative assessments: for example, the
Tomatometer for movies158 or restaurant ratings on Zagat’s or Yelp. The
notion of market price itself is, in a sense, a quantifiable metric based on
qualitative assessments.159
B. Structure of the Market
It is not just what is bought and sold that determines negotiability; it’s
also how it is sold. Markets have various structural characteristics that determine whether the parties can negotiate over price. Most of our consumer
goods exist in markets that propose a fixed price. Shopping in a supermarket, for example, involves no negotiation—at most, a shopper may have to
bargain to return an item without a receipt. However, fixed prices are a relatively recent phenomenon.160 The two other methods of setting price are
private negotiations (or direct bargaining) and auctions.161 Private negotiations were the primary means of commerce, and they remain familiar in the
156 Id. at 88–89.
157 See generally Akerlof, supra note 46.
158 What is the Tomatometer™ , ROTTEN TOMATOES, https://www.rottentomatoes.com/
about#whatisthetomatometer (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
159 See ELLEN RUPPEL SHELL, CHEAP: THE HIGH COST OF DISCOUNT CULTURE 57 (2009)
(describing market price as “subjective” and noting that “[p]rice is a convenient, necessary
proxy for a lot of other things” (quoting sociologist Gerald Zaltman)).
160 Olav Velthuis, Damien’s Dangerous Idea: Valuing Contemporary Art at Auction, in THE
WORTH OF GOODS: VALUATION AND PRICING IN THE ECONOMY 178, 180 (Jens Beckert &
Patrik Aspers eds., 2011).
161 Id. at 179–80.
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prototypical bazaar.162 Auctions are a structured set of consecutive bids from
competing potential buyers that result with the highest bid as the winner.163
All three structures are used in different markets, and some markets are
mixed: retail car sales, for example, have a fixed price but generally expect
negotiation off of that price.164 Fixed prices have the lowest transaction
costs, but they do not allow the price discrimination afforded by the other
two markets. But the negotiation variance is much higher with private negotiations than they are with pure versions of the other two systems.165 While
auctions can be expensive to construct and run, the parties simply make a
bid; they are not “negotiating” in the traditional sense of the word.166
The method of interaction is a related but conceptually different aspect
of market structure. Parties can communicate through rich or lean media,
along a spectrum of a variety of signals and cajolery, or simply price and
specifics. Internet transactions generally have limited interactions; even if
the online market allows for bargaining, those negotiations have usually been
in the form or text or perhaps emojis. The improving ability for wireless and
wired service providers to carry bandwidth makes it easier to communicate
through audio or even audio-visual communication. But this communication
will be different than in-person interaction, allowing for a different approach
to negotiation.
Aspers also differentiates between fixed-role markets and switch-role
markets.167 In fixed-role markets, individuals are usually either buyers or
sellers. In switch-role markets, the parties change positions over time, serving
as both buyers and sellers depending on the transaction. Theoretical markets in economic texts for the most part assume switch-role markets, with
atomistic relations between parties, despite the prevalence of fixed-role markets.168 Because switch-role markets, such as the traditional bazaar, emphasize the importance of trading qua trading, negotiation skills may be more
valuable within these markets.169
And to the extent markets are creatures of law, the nature of that law will
structure the market in myriad ways. We will return more specifically to this
162

Clifford Geertz, Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou, in MEANING AND ORDER IN MOROCSOCIETY: THREE ESSAYS IN CULTURAL ANALYSIS 123, 221–22 (Clifford Geertz, Hildred
Geertz & Lawrence Rosen eds., 1979).
163 Velthuis, supra note 160, at 180.
164 See Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car Purchases:
Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 104 J. POL. ECON. 622, 623 (1996).
165 Velthuis, supra note 160, at 181 (“Economists have little more to say on private
negotiations than that these are ‘best avoided’ because they are likely to result in ‘disagreement and inefficiency.’” (quoting Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, J. ECON.
PERSPS., Summer 1989, at 3, 19)).
166 See Milgrom, supra note 165, at 18–19; Velthuis, supra note 160, at 181 (noting the
time and expense necessary to host an auction, although noting that online auctions can
be held less expensively).
167 ASPERS, supra note 149, at 83.
168 Id. at 83–84.
169 Id. at 84.

CAN
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topic in Section IV.A, when we examine the role of contract law in addressing
negotiation variance. But the rules of the market, as well as the ways in which
those rules are interpreted, enforced, and potentially changed, can have a
significant impact on the extent to which parties are left to their own negotiating devices as opposed to appealing to allowing the system to dictate a nonnegotiated result.
C. Norms and Practices of the Market
A critical—but harder to measure—aspect of market negotiation variance is the extent to which the collected norms and practices of a particular
market allow for or facilitate private bargaining. As noted above, the practice
of posted prices does not preclude buyers from endeavoring to get a better
deal, but most markets have an accepted way of proceeding for most of the
participants.170 These practices vary from market to market, and from culture to culture. Modern Americans are thought to be more averse to bargaining than other cultures, with haggling appearing to be aggressive,
unpleasant, and impolite.171 Other cultures have been purported to
embrace bargaining more enthusiastically.172 But even in the United States,
bargaining thrives in certain markets, but it finds ways to express itself that
are socially acceptable within that market. In her decades-long observations
of garage sales, Gretchen Herrmann observed the following bargaining
norms: negotiations should be brief; the buyer’s offer should not diverge too
sharply from the listed price; buyers should not haggle over inexpensive
items; negotiating on bulk purchases is seen as reasonable; bargaining over
every item is viewed distastefully; friends do not bargain; and bargaining is
more acceptable and prevalent toward the end of the sale.173 Violations of
the norms can shut down bargaining; or, it may work for a particular item but
then cut the buyer off from further negotiations.
Standardized terms, known as boilerplate, are used in many industries to
shortcut the bargaining process. Standardized agreements, known as contracts of adhesion, collect a set of standardized terms into a form contract
that is generally a take-it-or-leave-it affair. These standardized arrangements
save negotiation and other transaction costs by reducing the precontractual
170 Michael A. Arnold & Steven A. Lippman, Posted Prices Versus Bargaining in Markets
with Asymmetric Information, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 450, 450 (1998).
171 Gretchen M. Herrmann, Negotiating Culture: Conflict and Consensus in U.S. Garage-Sale
Bargaining, 42 ETHNOLOGY 237, 238, 245 (2003); Ezra Rosser, Offsetting and the Consumption
of Social Responsibility, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 27, 33 (2011) (“While in other countries there
exists a tradition of negotiating over price, in the United States haggling is almost nonexistent. And while consumers do comparison shop and bargain hunt, there is implicit acceptance that price corresponds to value and that price is market determined.”).
172 Herrmann, supra note 171, at 247 (“Other foreign-born residents, such as Russians,
Ukrainians, and Yugoslavians (self-designation), are known as avid bargainers.”); see also
White, supra note 123, at 930 (extemporizing on differences between racial and ethnic
groups).
173 Herrmann, supra note 171, at 246–47.
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“negotiations” to a single decision. They are meant to tilt the playing field in
the direction of the drafter, with respect to terms over which the other party
will not understand or care enough about to bargain.174 These forms tend to
be common in the consumer context, and they have especially proliferated in
the online environment.175
Markets also differ in terms of disclosure, transparency, and secrecy. To
some extent, the information available about a transaction will depend on
the characteristics of the transaction subject, as well as the economic and
legal structure of the market. In employment, for example, wages could easily be made publicly available, but for the most part the norm is to keep one’s
pay private.176 These norms differ by career, status, and experience, but they
provide for more room for negotiations over the exact contours of the
employment relationship. Secrecy leads to information asymmetry, which
then provides a larger role for negotiation.177 Clifford Geertz has documented the role of information search and bargaining as a mixed process in
the Moroccan bazaar.178 In contrast, markets with disclosed prices make it
easier for buyers to compare and contrast, and for the market to reward
lower prices and punish higher prices without actual bargaining taking place.
*

*

*

Overall, many markets have products, structures, or norms that reduce
the role of bargaining in the transactional process. But certain markets lend
themselves to negotiation. Our preliminary taxonomy is designed to provide
a starting point for economics, sociological, psychological, and legal scholars
in developing further insights into the role of negotiation in particular markets. As legal scholars, we turn to examine the extent to which the law incorporates negotiation variance into its doctrines regarding transactions.
IV. NEGOTIATION VARIANCE

AND THE

LAW

An acknowledgement of negotiation variance is generally absent from
the discussion of markets in various academic disciplines. In this Part, we
turn expressly to law and examine the ways in which legal doctrines have
174 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1177 (1983) (providing characteristics of adhesive contracts).
175 Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 464 (2002) (“Notably, electronic contracts, like transactions in
the paper world, are dominated by standard forms.”).
176 Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”:
Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168–69 (2004);
Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
41, 41–42, 47 n.37 (2005).
177 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, Essay, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law,
109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886 (2000).
178 Geertz, supra note 89, at 31 (“From the point of view of search, the productive type
of bargaining is that of the firmly clientelized buyer and seller exploring the dimensions of
a particular, likely to be consummated transaction.”).
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addressed the role of negotiation ability in the transactional regulation. We
begin with an overview of contract law and then move to specific examinations of settlement agreements, corporate combinations, and employment.
In each of these areas, the law does not overtly recognize negotiation’s influence, but its effects can be seen underneath the doctrinal surface.
A. Negotiation and the Common Law of Contract
The common law of contract provides the foundation for transactions in
our economic system.179 The common law addresses a myriad number of
aspects of the transactional process: formation, interpretation, defenses, conditions, and enforcement. But negotiation per se is not specifically
addressed. The following Section will explore the extent to which contract
law acknowledges, accommodates, or regulates bargaining through doctrines
that are not geared exclusively to negotiation but nevertheless encompass it.
1. Requirement of a Bargain
Contracts require a bargain. More specifically, “the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to
the exchange and a consideration.”180 The Restatement defines the “two
essential elements of a bargain” as “agreement and exchange.”181 The agreement usually manifests through an offer and an acceptance, which signify
that the parties both are on the same page as to the terms of the contract.182
The exchange is represented through consideration, which requires a transaction in which the parties exchange something of value for another thing of
value. But consideration must be bargained for. According to the bargain
test of consideration, something is bargained for “if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for [the] promise and is given by the promisee in exchange
for that promise.”183 One of the primary effects of the bargain requirement
is to focus on transactions within a marketplace, while casting doubt on transactions within families or intimate relationships.184
While courts have emphasized the need for a bargain, for the most part
they have not required actual bargaining.185 Instead, the exchange can be
179 See Hanoch Dagan, Avihay Dorfman, Roy Kreitner & Daniel Markovits, The Law of
the Market, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at i, iii (“Contract is the key mechanism
for exchanging entitlements, and this makes contract central to markets, however
conceived.”).
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 17 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
181 See id. § 17 cmt.b.
182 Id. § 22.
183 Id. § 71(2).
184 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 2.2, at 48.
185 See, e.g., id. § 2.6, at 55 (“[I]t is not required that the parties actually bargain over
the terms of their agreement.”); Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp., 895 A.2d
595, 602 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“The bargain theory of consideration does not actually
require that the parties bargain over the terms of the agreement.” (quoting E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.6 (1990))).
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arrived at simply, without haggling, as long as the parties each provide something of value in exchange for something of value. A few courts have noted
the lack of interchange between parties and therefore found an absence of
consideration.186 For the most part, however, courts police only the
exchange itself to ensure that the contract is not a gift promise or gratuity.187
The bargaining itself is not subject to investigation, and neither is the fairness
of the exchange.188 It is well-established contracts dogma that a party may
exchange something as small as a peppercorn for something far more valuable, as long as the exchange is genuine.189
Commentators have noted that the sometimes-implicit idea behind contracts—that the parties will bargain with each other to reach their
exchange—is becoming more of a myth than reality. As one noted hornbook describes it:
Most of contract law is premised upon a model consisting of two alert individuals, mindful of their self-interest, hammering out an agreement by a process of hard bargaining. The process of entering into a contract of
adhesion, however “is not one of haggle or cooperative process but rather of
a fly and flypaper.” Courts, legislators and scholars have become increasingly aware of this divergence between the theory and practice of contract
formation, and new techniques are evolving for coping with the challenges
stemming from this divergence.190

Despite its name, however, the “bargain theory” of consideration does not
concern itself with the level of negotiation that goes into a final agreement.
186 See, e.g., Jara v. Suprema Meats, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 187, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that one party’s failure to provide nothing “more than acquiescence” to the other
party’s proposal “cannot be reasonably construed as a bid to enter into a bilateral contract”); Bogigian v. Bogigian, 551 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the
parties “did not bargain for the release in exchange for any benefits flowing to [one party]
for detriments incurred by [the other party]”).
187 George S. Geis, Gift Promises and the Edge of Contract Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 663,
668 n.14 (“A few courts seem to require evidence of negotiations or even haggling. . . . But
this is an exaggerated view of the bargaining requirement and not the prevailing
approach.” (citations omitted)).
188 FRIED, supra note 61, at 29 (“The law is not at all interested in the adequacy of the
consideration. The goodness of the exchange is for the parties alone to judge—the law is
concerned only that there be an exchange.” (citation omitted)); JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 4.4, at 154 (6th ed. 2009) (“As a general rule the
courts do not review the adequacy of the consideration. The parties make their own
bargains.”).
189 Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 343–44
(2002) (“The consideration can be as nominal as a peppercorn for the agreement to be
legally enforceable. Courts do not inquire into the distribution of benefits between the
parties.” (footnotes omitted)); Note, The Peppercorn Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine of
Fair Exchange in Contract Law, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1092 (1935) (arguing that value
disparity in an exchange is supportable where the promisor “both knew and desired such
disparity” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
190 PERILLO, supra note 188, § 1.3, at 5 (quoting Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19
AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143 (1970)).
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2. Parties’ Ability and Capacity to Negotiate
Contract law does not specifically examine or regulate the individual
parties’ ability to negotiate. However, certain existing defenses concern the
underlying capacity of the parties in a way that may cover extreme types of
negotiation variance. The contractual defenses of infancy and incapacity are
the primary escape hatches for those who may lack the capacity to contract
for themselves—in Farnsworth’s words, “an inability to participate meaningfully in the bargaining process.”191 The immaturity defense is a bright-line
rule in which anyone under a certain cutoff age can render the contract voidable after the fact.192 The reasoning behind this defense is that as a class,
younger people do not have the reasoning, understanding, or judgment to
responsibly bargain for a binding deal.193 Incapacity generally relates to a
permanent or temporary underlying condition that renders one “unable to
understand . . . the nature and consequences of the transaction,” or “unable
to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction.”194 However,
courts have recognized something of an exception where the underlying contract is fair, either by fudging the finding of incapacity195 or through a specific “fairness exception.”196 For some forms of incapacity, especially
intoxication, courts have permitted the defense only where the other party
knew of the incapacity and was in a position to take advantage of it during
the negotiations.197
The closest that courts have come to taking into account an individual’s
own ability to bargain effectively is through the doctrine of unconscionability.
Dating back to the English courts of equity, judges have routinely, though
infrequently, policed agreements on the basis of their unfairness.198 The
unfairness of the terms themselves tells part of the story, but courts must also
figure out why the one party ended up with such a bad deal. As a result, the
doctrine has broken down into two conjunctive parts: substantive unconscionability and procedural unconscionability.199 Substantive unconscionability
refers to “unreasonably favorable” terms; procedural unconscionability refers
to the process by which those terms were reached.200 As described by Allan
191 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 4.2, at 219.
192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 14 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (rendering contracts
voidable “until the beginning of the day before the person’s eighteenth birthday”).
193 See, e.g., Porter v. Wilson, 209 A.2d 730, 731 (N.H. 1965) (citing to “the common-law
conception that a minor does not possess the discretion and experience of adults”); Henry
v. Root, 33 N.Y. 526, 536 (1865) (noting that the defense’s purpose is to “protect infants or
minors from their own improvidence and folly”).
194 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 15 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
195 PERILLO, supra note 188, § 8.9 at 263 (“[I]f the contract is fair and beneficial to the
alleged incompetent there will be a great tendency to find sanity; otherwise, the tendency
is to find lack of capacity.”).
196 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 15(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
197 Id. § 15(1)(b); id. § 16.
198 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 4.27, at 294–95.
199 Id. § 4.28, at 301–02.
200 Id.
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Farnsworth: “Procedural unconscionability is broadly conceived to encompass not only the employment of sharp bargaining practices and the use of
fine print and convoluted language, but a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power, a term that is often used to include bargaining
skill.”201 Procedural unconscionability can include many elements that do
not specifically include negotiation ability. For example, arbitration clauses
are frequently challenged in consumer or employment contracts, not based
on the individual’s negotiation effectiveness, but rather on the structural
issues of using standard-form agreements that are required for purchase or
employment.202 Even when the courts cite to a “gross inequality of bargaining power,” they largely mean structural issues such as monopoly power, disaggregated consumers or employees, or contracts of adhesion.203
For a set of unconscionability cases, however, courts have looked at a
party’s lack of education, lower social status, or personality traits to conclude
that the other party took advantage of a bargaining weakness. In the case of
Wollums v. Horsley,204 the court denied enforcement of a contract in which
Wollums had sold mineral rights on his property to Horsley for much less
than market price. Discussing the parties’ relative bargaining abilities, the
court noted that Wollums was “about 60 years old, uneducated, afflicted with
disease disabling him from work,” while Horsley was “a man of large and
varied experience in business.”205 This theme is echoed in other cases. In
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., perhaps our most influential unconscionability case, the buyer was “a person of limited education separated
from her husband, [who] is maintaining herself and her seven children by
means of public assistance.”206 Lack of education or “sophistication” are factors in the courts’ determination that one party was prone to disadvantage in
negotiations,207 especially when paired with the other party’s relative exper201 Id. (footnotes omitted).
202 See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1459–64 (2008); Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and
Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470.
203 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 185 A.3d 836, 843 (N.H. 2018); Bagley v. Mt.
Bachelor, Inc., 340 P.3d 27, 35, 39 (Or. 2014) (en banc).
204 20 S.W. 781, 782 (Ky. 1892).
205 Id. at 781.
206 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. 1964).
207 See, e.g., High v. Cap. Senior Living Props. 2—Heatherwood, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d
789, 799 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“[To determine procedural unconscionability, a court must]
focus on the ‘real and voluntary meeting of the minds’ of the parties at the time that the
contract was executed and consider factors such as: ‘(1) relative bargaining power; (2) age;
(3) education; (4) intelligence; (5) business savvy and experience; (6) the drafter of the
contract; and (7) whether the terms were explained to the ‘weaker’ party.’” (quoting Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. Mich. 1976))); Manley v. Personacare,
No. 2005-L-174, 2007-Ohio-343, at ¶ 14, 2007 WL 210583, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26,
2007) (“Procedural unconscionability involves those factors bearing on the relative bargaining position of the contracting parties, including their age, education, intelligence,
business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract,
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tise.208 Conversely, equal bargaining ability has been a factor in finding no
unconscionability.209
The unconscionability cases show the difficulty in trying to separate
negotiation effectiveness from other overlapping characteristics and factors.
Education and sophistication are used as a proxy not only for the ability to
bargain well, but also for the ability to use information, and even get the
information in the first place. The arbitration cases illustrate this: courts
point to the fact that the clauses are often complicated and confusing, which
means that the average consumer or employee does not have the understanding of the long-term ramifications of the clause.210 But in such cases,
courts either refer to some baseline level of ability, or point out how the
particular party would have particular difficulty in bargaining for the contract.211 Negotiation effectiveness is considered, but often in a bundle with
other overlapping considerations.
3. Structure of the Market
Certain markets employ tactics that severely limit or eliminate one
party’s ability to bargain over the terms of the deal. In most cases, the law
neither facilitates nor hinders these practices. Posted and fixed prices are
one method of eliminating the transaction costs related to bargaining. The
law does not particularly encourage or discourage the use of fixed prices for
consumers; the market has adopted this practice to adjust to mass retail shopping practices.212 Courts have occasionally grumbled about the fixed nature
of contracts of adhesion, noting that they drain the idea of the bargaining
whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, and whether alterations in the
printed terms were possible.” (quoting Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 837 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1998))).
208 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (discussing situations where parties with “experience, specialization, licensure, economic strength or position, or membership in associations created for their mutual benefit and education, have
acquired such expertise or monopolistic or practical control in the business transaction
involved as to give them an undue advantage”).
209 See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. N. Utils., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 330 (10th Cir. 1982)
(finding no unconscionability when “experienced negotiators for both parties entered into
an agreement after several months of give-and-take”).
210 See, e.g., Villa Milano Homeowners Ass’n v. Il Davorge, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 11 (Ct.
App. 2000) (discussing a “prolix form” that was a “deliberate attempt to circumvent statutory protections”).
211 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (“The manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important
terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices?”).
212 State truth-in-advertising laws, as well as the Federal Trade Act’s prohibition on
deceptive practices, does mean that fixed prices cannot be changed after the fact to make
them higher. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2018); 16 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2011) (“No advertisement containing an offer to sell a product should be published when the offer is not a bona fide
effort to sell the advertised product.”).
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process of any actual back-and-forth.213 With the proliferation of such agreements in modern commerce, especially online, courts have largely acquiesced even with the knowledge that there has been no bargaining or even
understanding from one consumer. While “click-wrap” agreements are the
subject of much debate by academics, judges, and policymakers,214 for our
purposes we can note that they are common and that they reduce negotiation variance within their marketplaces, at least on the part of the consumer
or employee.
4. Nature of Relationship and Conduct Between Parties
The common law of contract polices the conduct of parties within the
negotiations. Threats of violence are also not a legitimate bargaining tactic.
The defense of duress renders a contract void—nonexistent—when “physically compelled,”215 and the contract is voidable if “induced by an improper
threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative.”216
Such threats are usually not considered to be within the realm of legitimate
negotiation efforts.
Similarly, parties cannot endeavor to distort the pool of information on
which the other party is depending. Fraud or misrepresentation is not permitted; unintentional misrepresentation is merely a contract defense, while
intentional fraud can also be a tort or a crime.217 Generally parties are not
required to disclose information except under circumstances involving bad
faith or prior assertions.218 To the extent that lying may be considered a
valid negotiation move by some, the law tolerates it if the matter is not material or does not induce the other party to form the contract.219 One can
generally prevaricate when discussing a reservation point or bargaining position.220 Even though these are “lies,” they are set aside as legitimate methods
for use in negotiations.
Moving beyond factual information, parties have much more flexibility
in how they present their case. Generally, there is no defense against an
213 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 4.26, at 285 (“Traditional contract law was designed
for a paradigmatic agreement that had been reached by two parties of equal bargaining
power by a process of free negotiation. Today, however, in routine transactions the typical
agreement consists of a standard printed form containing terms prepared by one party and
assented to by the other with little or no opportunity for negotiation.”).
214 For a description of one recent effort at the problem by reporters for the American
Law Institute, see Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Searching
for the Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 7, 10–11 (2017).
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 174 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
216 Id. § 175. The scope of improper threats beyond injury includes crimes, torts, criminal or civil prosecution, and bad faith. Id. § 176.
217 Id. § 164; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST. 1977); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 223.3 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
218 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 161 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
219 Id. § 164.
220 See White, supra note 123, at 927–28.
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intentionally incorrect opinion, as the party is not justified in relying on it.221
Similarly permitted is so-called puffery: “a ‘vague statement’ boosting the
appeal of a service or product that, because of its vagueness and unreliability,
is immunized from regulation.”222 Puffery is a well-worn sales tactic that at
times skirts the line between permissible and unlawful. To the extent that
courts have found opinions and puffery to raise a defense against enforcement, they have focused on more extreme cases in which one side seems to
have gotten the better of the other. Commentators have framed these efforts
at enforcement as a way of policing the fairness of agreements and the negotiations that led to them.223 But one of their concerns is disparity in negotiation effectiveness.
One prominent example of crossing the line is casebook staple Vokes v.
Arthur Murray, Inc.224 Plaintiff Vokes, a widow who prepaid over $30,000
(between 1961–62) for over 2000 hours of dance lessons, sought the return
of the monies she had advanced to the company. Rather than looking to
unconscionability or incapacity, the court relied on false representations as
to Vokes’s dancing ability. The studio had used “false representations to her
that she was improving in her dancing ability, that she had excellent potential, that she was responding to instructions in dancing grace, and that they
were developing her into a beautiful dancer.”225 Such blandishments must
be fairly routine; it’s hard to imagine much success for instructors who are
ruthlessly honest about their students’ skills. But it is extraordinary for a
dance student to agree to pay such sums ahead of the actual lessons. The
court believed that “it should have been reasonably apparent to defendants
that her vast outlay of cash for the many hundreds of additional hours of
instruction was not justified by her slow and awkward progress, which she
would have been made well aware of if they had spoken the ‘whole truth.’ ”226
Clearly, the studio had taken advantage of Vokes, and the court stepped in—
221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 169 (AM. L. INST. 1981). The exceptions to the
rule include fiduciary relationships, the invocation of special skill, judgment, or objectivity,
and particular susceptibility to misrepresentation. Id.
222 David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1397 (2006); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 169 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“It may be
assumed, for example, that a seller will express a favorable opinion concerning what he has
to sell. When he praises it in general terms, commonly known as ‘puffing’ or ‘sales talk,’
without specific content or reference to facts, buyers are expected to understand that they
are not entitled to rely.”).
223 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 724 (1999) (“Once it is acknowledged that consumer risk perceptions may be affected by, for instance, the manner in which information
is framed, then it becomes inevitable that manufacturers will exploit those framing effects
in a way that maximizes manufacturer profits.”); Hoffman, supra note 222, at 1398 (“Courts
seek to discourage speech leading to ‘bad’ consumption and to protect speech leading to
‘good’ consumption.”).
224 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
225 Id. at 908.
226 Id. at 909.
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with a fairly stretched version of misrepresentation—to prevent the bargain
from being enforced.
The Vokes case has been categorized under the “special skill or judgment” exception to the general freedom to opine. There is also an exception
for parties who are particularly susceptible to being misled by false opinions.
The exception is aimed at those who are “particularly vulnerable to misrepresentation,” and includes “lack of intelligence, illiteracy, and unusual credulity
or gullibility.”227 These cases are also handled under the doctrine of undue
influence. Although many of the undue influence cases involve special relationships (such as fiduciaries),228 the defense also encompasses situations in
which a more talented negotiator wheedles an unfair bargain out of a näif.
The Restatement defines undue influence as “unfair persuasion of a party who
is under the domination of the person exercising the persuasion or who by
virtue of the relation between them is justified in assuming that that person
will not act in a manner inconsistent with [their] welfare.”229 John Calamari
and Joseph Perillo cite to four factors in finding a prima facie case of undue
influence: (1) susceptibility to influence, (2) opportunity to use influence,
(3) disposition to take advantage, and (4) an unfair result.230
Undue influence provides courts with a tool to rescue the victims of onesided negotiations from the consequences, even in the absence of fraud or
duress. In Foote v. Wilson,231 the court singled out a merchant who cajoled a
farmer into buying his wholesale supplies without an inventory:
So-called “dealers’ talk” . . . is morally reprehensible because it is
intended to produce the psychological effect of representation without
incurring the penalties of representation. Tradesmen of the better class
scorn to resort to it. . . . A few dealers still cling to the double standard of
morals—one for church on Sunday, and one for business on week days.
They display raucous mirth at the “sentimental” notion that men are their
brothers’ keepers in business, and that the Golden Rule applies to the relation between buyer and seller, and they exercise in full the privilege of trimming with luring “opinions,” seductive “puffing,” and shrewdly equivocal
“shop talk,” still permitted them by the remnant of the discredited doctrine
of caveat emptor.232

This jeremiad against salesmanship—at least in its extreme version—illustrates the use of undue influence to police bargaining results.
Another undue influence case provides a list of hard-bargaining tactics
indicative of undue influence:
227 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 169 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also Adan v.
Steinbrecher, 133 N.W. 477, 478 (Minn. 1911) (citing to the facts that “the parties were not
dealing at arm’s length; that plaintiff was wholly ignorant of the value of property; that by
the improper influence exercised over him pending the negotiations by defendant’s agent
he was deprived of an opportunity to learn the truth”).
228 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 4.20, at 264–65.
229 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 177 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
230 PERILLO, supra note 188, § 9.10, at 287–88.
231 178 P. 430 (Kan. 1919).
232 Id. at 430–31.
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[O]verpersuasion is generally accompanied by certain characteristics which
tend to create a pattern. The pattern usually involves several of the following elements: (1) discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropriate time, (2) consummation of the transaction in an unusual place, (3)
insistent demand that the business be finished at once, (4) extreme emphasis on untoward consequences of delay, (5) the use of multiple persuaders by
the dominant side against a single servient party, (6) absence of third-party
advisers to the servient party, (7) statements that there is no time to consult
financial advisers or attorneys. If a number of these elements are simultaneously present, the persuasion may be characterized as excessive.233

As these cases point out, the law does not generally police bargaining behavior.234 But for the exceptional cases of hard bargaining, these defenses are
available to correct the injustice.
Despite these many doctrines that do regulate the parties’ behavior in
the context of negotiations, the common law does not require bargaining in
good faith.235 The notion of good faith has primarily applied to postformation performance, and the idea is to prevent opportunism after the fact by
interpreting the contract in a way that violates its spirit.236 Before the contract has been formed, the parties have not committed to the joint performance, and therefore do not have the implied covenant of treating each other
in good faith.237 But parties have been punished for breaching agreements
to negotiate in good faith, including cases in which the agreement was
implied from the parties’ behavior or enforced through promissory estoppel.
In Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A.,238 the court found that the parties had
impliedly promised to bargain in good faith, and that one party had failed to
do so. The court stated:
[W]e believe there are sound public policy reasons for protecting parties to
a business negotiation from bad faith practices by their negotiating partners.
Gone are the days when our ancestors sat around a fire and bargained for
the exchange of stone axes for bear hides. Today the stakes are much
higher and negotiations are much more complex.239
233 Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); see also
Methodist Mission Home of Tex. v. N——A——B——, 451 S.W.2d 539, 542–43 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970) (upholding finding that “plaintiff was subjected to excessive persuasion”).
234 Methodist Mission, 451 S.W.2d at 543 (“It is true that exerted influence cannot be
branded as ‘undue’ merely because it is persuasive and effective, and that the law does not
condemn all persuasion, entreaty, cajolery, importunity, intercession, argument and solicitation.”); Odorizzi, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (“The difficulty, of course, lies in determining when
the forces of persuasion have overflowed their normal banks and become oppressive flood
waters.”).
235 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 3.26, at 189; PERILLO supra note 188, § 11.38, at 412.
236 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 8.15, at 566.
237 Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Before the
contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a natural wariness. Neither expects
the other to be particularly forthcoming, and therefore there is no deception when one is
not. Afterwards the situation is different.”).
238 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
239 Id.
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In a significant line of well-known cases, courts have held parties to their
promises during negotiations, even if (or especially if) no agreement has
been reached.240
*

*

*

On the surface, the common law of contract purports to let the parties
bargain unfettered by restrictions. However, we have seen that in numerous
doctrines, courts act in part to correct the results of negotiations that they
find to be unfair or substantially uneven. Certainly, as a general rule, courts
are not overtly concerned with high levels of negotiation variance. But when
confronted with situations in which one party has used that variance to take
advantage of the other, they will at times step in to adjust the bargain
accordingly.
B. Regulating in High-Negotiation Variance Markets
The story is similar in individual markets: the law does not overtly take
negotiation effectiveness into account, but the effects ripple through underneath the surface. In markets with high-negotiation variance, assumptions
about the consistency of market price, the fairness of the outcome, and the
role of the parties within the negotiation do not hold true. We look at three
high-variance markets—the markets for lawsuit settlements, corporate control, and employment—and examine how the law has responded to the
potential for negotiation imbalance within them.241
1. Market for Lawsuit Settlements
Common wisdom about lawsuits in the last forty years of law and economics scholarship posits that most cases will settle, and settlement has been
modeled as following a fairly straightforward calculus. When the settlement
value is greater for the plaintiff (and lower for the defendant) than the
expected value of the case at trial, subtracting transaction costs, settlement
will occur.242 When there is mutual agreement as to the case’s expected trial
value, then all cases should settle.243 Because parties do not always have per240 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 274–75 (Wis. 1965);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 3.26, at 196–201.
241 These are by no means the only high-negotiation-variance markets. See, e.g.,
Levmore & Fagan, supra note 6, at 1491–98 (discussing automobile sales, medical services,
and law school scholarships).
242 Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1075 (1989); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984).
243 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 568–89 (6th ed. 2003); Steven
Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 63–64 (1982).
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fect, symmetrical information,244 and/or because the law is uncertain,245
they may not agree, and this lack of agreement, in the world of economic
analysis, is what stymies agreement.
Scholars of litigation processes have made efforts to build models to predict which cases will go to trial. George Priest and Benjamin Klein, for example, focus on disagreement about the law as the key determinant of
settlement versus trial.246 They argue that cases where settlement will not be
reached are most likely to be those with uncertain legal outcomes based on
existing precedent; thus, cases that go to trial should thus be resolved in
court with approximately an even split between victories for the plaintiff and
for the defendant.247 Other scholars have focused more on the information
asymmetries as the determinant of settlement: for instance, Steven Shavell
argued against Priest and Klein’s “even split” prediction, positing that tried
cases could land with any probability distribution for the parties’ victories;
the determinant would be asymmetrical information between the plaintiff
and defendant.248 Empirical data in a variety of studies have not consistently
borne out the “even split” hypothesis.249
In these models, there is little room for individual human behavior
around negotiation: there is no term in these equations for negotiation skill
or effectiveness or variation based on the specific interpersonal interaction
rather than on structural factors. These models predict that parties with
complete information, in a system where the law is fully known and predictable, would all settle their cases250—presumably for a similar amount—an
amount that perfectly accounts for the expected value of the case minus the
transaction costs. Yet even if such information were exchanged and the law
was fully transparent, negotiation scholars would insist with certainty that outcomes would vary widely (even if they all satisfied the baseline conditions of
surpassing for the party the value of the case minus transaction costs).
What this suggests for the selection of cases for dispute is complicated
and difficult to reduce to a single variable. As discussed above, negotiation
skill and effectiveness are multifaceted constructs that include a variety of
types of behavior, and depend on the unique interaction between the parties.
However, considering the role of negotiation acumen in how, when, and
244 POSNER, supra note 243, at 69–70; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement
Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 404 (1984).
245 POSNER, supra note 243, at 589.
246 See Priest & Klein, supra note 242.
247 Id. at 4–5.
248 Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
493, 500 (1996).
249 Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with
Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 339–40 (1990); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 188 (1993); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL.
ECON. 229, 255–56 (1995); Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 185, 185 (1985).
250 Shavell, supra note 243, at 64.
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whether cases settle can illuminate some of the challenges in pinning down
an answer to what kinds of cases will go to trial. It is not even as simple as
looking at the skill level of the lawyers involved to make a prediction about
whether or not settlement will occur. That is, consider the matrix of potential poor or skilled negotiators in the very simplest of two-party interactions:

Lawyer B: Poor
Lawyer B: Skilled

Lawyer A: Poor
Poor / Poor
Skilled / Poor

Lawyer A: Skilled
Poor / Skilled
Skilled / Skilled

Nothing about these match-ups is certain, and any effort to make predictions is necessarily speculative until more data about these dyadic processes
are gathered. For example, one might imagine that two skilled negotiators
would reach agreement any time a settlement offer is greater than the value
of the case less transaction costs. However, more skilled negotiators might
each set higher aspirations for their negotiation outcome, and their clients
might have similarly higher expectations. Two poor negotiators might bumble till neither could reach agreement, but even one poor negotiator may put
an offer on the table that is too good to pass up by the other side. And the
mismatched pair is likely to be equally unpredictable: stuck at the whim of a
poor negotiator, a good negotiator may be hamstrung, or a good negotiator
may be able to guide the negotiation smoothly to a satisfactory outcome. In
addition, the two-party model only hints at the true complexity of the negotiation process in litigation. Lawyers (even in a simple two-party suit) negotiate not just with one another but with their own clients.251 Intractable
clients, laissez-faire clients, clients who have concerns beyond economic outcomes—all of these factors may influence the success of the lawyer at crafting
a durable settlement agreement. While lawyers exert influence over their
clients, their clients also retain ultimate settlement authority.252 Any effort to
model the way in which effective negotiation yields cases for trial versus settlement is exceptionally complicated and unlikely to yield accurate prediction
based on current data, but it is a mistake to simply write off the negotiation
process as meaningless in yielding case outcomes.
Negotiation has not been ignored entirely by those who study case settlement. Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser’s influential exploration of
251 See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381,
420–31 (2010).
252 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 664 (1976); Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of
Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation
Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811, 839–42 (1987); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology,
Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 82 (1997);
Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement
Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 795,
796–98 (1998); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 364 (2008).
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the way that legal endowments help to play a role in guiding outcomes for
legal cases changed perceptions of the ways in which negotiations proceeded
in the legal arena.253 Their “bargaining in the shadow of the law” shaped
perspectives on negotiation for years to come, guiding numerous scholars to
consider the role of legal rules in an array of different settings. 254 Mnookin
and Kornhauser explicitly focus on negotiation as the process by which settlement is reached.255 But what is most notable, for our purposes here, is that
their focus is exclusively on the role that the law plays in what they call the
“bargaining process,” not considering the inverse—that is, the role that the
negotiation itself might eventually play in shaping the law.
Nor did Mnookin and Kornhauser go deep into the negotiation process,
beyond the idea of bargaining power, to critically examine the role of negotiation skill in these cases. They identify factors that they see as the most
“important influences or determinants of the outcomes of bargaining,”
which are:
(1) the preferences of the divorcing parents; (2) the bargaining endowments created by legal rules that indicate the particular allocation a court
will impose if the parties fail to reach agreement; (3) the degree of uncertainty concerning the legal outcome if the parties go to court, which is
linked to the parties’ attitudes towards risk; (4) transaction costs and the
parties’ respective abilities to bear them; and (5) strategic behavior.256

While acknowledging only one real “process” factor, strategic behavior, they
go on to state that “[t]he actual bargain that is struck through negotiations—
indeed, whether a bargain is struck at all—depends on the negotiation
process.”257
So, what is so-called “strategic behavior” in this negotiation arena?
Scholars in this area have essentialized strategic behavior to issues around
information and misrepresentation. Mnookin and Kornhauser give several
examples: first, regarding information exchange, they note, “information
may be accurate or intentionally inaccurate; each party may promise,
threaten, or bluff.”258 In addition, they focus on communication about the
state of the governing law: “Parties may intentionally exaggerate their
chances of winning in court in the hope of persuading the other side to
accept less. Or they may threaten to impose substantial transaction costs—
economic or psychological—on the other side.”259
253 See generally Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 147.
254 Indeed, there is almost a cottage industry in “in the shadow of” articles. See, e.g.,
Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in
GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158, 158 (2000); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini, 53 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 605, 605 (2003);
Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621, 621
(2003).
255 Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 147, at 950.
256 Id. at 966.
257 Id. at 972.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 972–73.
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This vision of strategic behavior does implicitly allow for differences in
ability to “promise, threaten, or bluff,” or to utilize rules, precedent, and reason, but there is no further elaboration on the potential for differences in
ability to deploy these strategies and associated tactics more or less effectively.
In fact, the decision to engage in one process or the other, and to what
extent, seems to be the primary decision point for their imagined negotiator.
And so-called “strategic behavior” is largely based in misrepresentation, information withholding, and threats: for example, Mnookin and Kornhauser
later assert that negotiation may fail to yield an outcome if “the parties get
heavily engaged in strategic behavior and get carried away with making
threats.”260
Even taking a more expansive view of strategic behavior—for example,
defining it more broadly as “trying to maneuver an opponent into accepting
an unfavorable distribution”—leaves much room for individuals to be better
or worse in this arena.261 While highlighting that there are “skillful bargainer[s]” whose “objective . . . is to convince others that [they] intend[ ] to
act in such a way that it is in [the other party’s] best interest to do what is in
[their] best interest,”262 scholars have noted that the “array of possible strategies is virtually unlimited.”263 While this relative complexity does not match
the streamlined “modeling games” so prominent in academic discussion of
legal settlement,264 even the broadest version of strategic bargaining
described here is in turn relatively thin in comparison to the vast scope of
psychological and economic research on bargaining and negotiation, which
characterizes dozens, if not hundreds, of different types of behavior as more
or less effective in negotiation.
In essence, previous literature on legal settlement uses an economic
framework to predict negotiation success or failure, but typically isolates only
one element of negotiation “skill”—that is, largely, the ability to conceal
information, make misrepresentations, and employ threats. Even the
broadest definition of strategic behavior relies on a win-lose, zero-sum framework and homes in on what a negotiator does in order to manipulate the
other party into accepting an unfavorable outcome. And even in this
broader definition of strategic behavior, the approach is fairly crabbed, failing to engage meaningfully in a more sophisticated exploration of what factors actually contribute to negotiation effectiveness.
260 Id. at 975.
261 Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228 (1982).
262 Id.
263 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 328 (1991).
264 In light of the complexity of strategic bargaining, Gross and Syverud add, “Most
research on bargaining in litigation consists . . . of modeling games that restrict the structure of offers, demands, and access to information in ways quite alien to actual litigation.”
Id. at 330.
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Much of the extant literature relies on a vision of negotiation as a winlose bargaining game that is belied by the rich tapestry of social science and
negotiation literature. While it is certainly the case that some negotiations
are characterized by this kind of strategic behavior, it is also the case that
even in those settings, some negotiators will be more or less effective in
employing these kinds of tactics. Some individuals are better than others at
concealment or misrepresentation, some are more credible in making
threats, others still are more efficacious in ferreting out dishonesty or threats
that lack true leverage. Still others may be more or less skilled in illuminating opportunities to shift from a win-lose to a win-win perspective, or in generating collaborative problem-solving outcomes. All of these features of
effective negotiators—complex though they may be—can have a meaningful—albeit currently unpredictable—impact on the set of cases that settle versus go to trial.
2. Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control refers to the market for a controlling
percentage of shares for publicly held corporations. A majority of outstanding shares is sufficient, but often less can provide control.265 As developed in
Henry Manne’s classic article on the subject, the market exists apart from the
trade in individual shares and offers opportunities for companies to combine
or be absorbed into a larger whole.266 Purchasing control rights allows the
buyer to implement changes in managerial policies and then reap the
rewards from those changes.267 Thus, the most important function of the
market is to discipline corporate executives who might otherwise grow complacent in a diffusely held company by threatening their hold over
governance.268
265 Many twenty-first century tech companies, such as Facebook and Google, provided
their founders with controlling stakes through share holdings that have greater voting
rights than the common shares. Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate
Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 687, 694, 704–05 (2019); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s
Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-evan-spiegel.html.
266 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110,
112 (1965) (“The basic proposition advanced in this paper is that the control of corporations may constitute a valuable asset; that this asset exists independent of any interest in
either economics of scale or monopoly profits; that an active market for corporate control
exists; and that a great many mergers are probably the result of the successful workings of
this special market.”).
267 Id. at 113 (“The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the take-over becomes to those who believe that
they can manage the company more efficiently. And the potential return from the successful takeover and revitalization of a poorly run company can be enormous.” (footnote
omitted)).
268 Id. (“Only the take-over scheme provides some assurance of competitive efficiency
among corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection to the interests of vast
numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders.”).
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For publicly traded companies, one might think that the market for corporate control is entirely devolved to electronic markets, and there is little
room for negotiation when shares are bought on public exchanges like the
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.269 These exchanges are perhaps
the quintessential example of a low-negotiation-variance market—one where
the parties interact only on a binary, yes-no basis and there is no bargaining
over price or other terms. But the market for corporate control operates
differently than the public market for shares. Due to federal regulation, a
party looking to purchase a controlling share of a public company must
announce its intentions once it owns or controls more than five percent of
the target company’s shares.270 It is not possible for a company to silently or
secretly suck up shares on the exchanges and then suddenly announce a controlling stake. Because of this structure, negotiations over the purchase of a
controlling stake are done in public through a tender offer or occur behind
the closed doors of executive suites. It is these private negotiations in which
negotiating ability can have an outsized effect on the outcome.
Discussions over corporate takeovers are held at the highest levels of
corporate governance and finance. Because of the desire for secrecy and the
need for the negotiating parties to have true bargaining authority, only top
executives participate. Although companies are only “in play” at particular
moments in their history, the market for corporate control essentially consists of corporate executives, specifically CEOs, and those institutions or individuals who control a large amount of capital, advised by a small coterie of
consultants, accountants, attorneys, and investment bankers. Confidentiality
in these talks is important to avoid the encouragement of competitors into
the market, the weakening of the target if talks fall through, and the avoidance of unnecessary turbulence within the markets as rumors and poor-quality information is spread.271 As a result, only a small number of company
officials are involved in merger and acquisition negotiations. The description of the talks over the AOL–Time Warner merger provide an illustrative
example:
[AOL CEO Steve] Case flew to New York to meet [Time Warner CEO Jerry]
Levin for a private dinner. To avoid being spotted together, they booked a
suite at Manhattan’s Rihga Royal Hotel . . . and ordered room service.
269 For a discussion of the role of microseconds in the sales of shares, see generally
MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS (2014).
270 The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),
78n(d)–(e) (2018)); see also Howard F. Mulligan, Note, The Continuing Validity of State Takeover Statutes—A Limited Third Generation, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 412, 413 (1987) (“[T]he
act makes it unlawful for any person to make a tender offer for more than five percent of
the equity securities of a 34 Act company, unless the offeror at the time of the offer has
filed a schedule with the SEC, including any solicitation materials prepared in connection
with the offer.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982)).
271 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234–35 (1988) (“To avoid a ‘bidding war’
over its target, an acquiring firm often will insist that negotiations remain confidential, and
at least one Court of Appeals has stated that ‘silence pending settlement of the price and
structure of a deal is beneficial to most investors, most of the time.’” (citations omitted)).
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It was an unforgettable evening, that dinner of November 1, 1999. Getting to know each other, Case and Levin talked the night away. They had so
much in common—a love of fine wines, for example. More crucially, they
were on a common mission. Business was not just about making money,
they agreed; it was about integrity, and values, and the greater good, and
making a difference.
....
By the end of the evening, Levin and Case were of one mind. Together
they could create the world’s most powerful and respected Internet-driven
media and entertainment company. They’d make the world a better
place.272

Although the pool of involved parties expands as the merger moves forward, the key components of the deal remain tied to decisions made early on,
and the CEOs retain the ultimate authority. The deal must eventually be
approved by the board of directors and, in most mergers, the shareholders,
but the merger is something of a fait accompli by the time it reaches these
groups. Presumably the board has the benefit of due diligence conducted by
investment banks, which is designed to draw out any potential flaws in the
merger.273 But there are reasons to believe that bankers will be predisposed
to support a deal.274 Moreover, diligence is conducted in incredibly short
periods of time.275 Critics contend that the process is window dressing as a
prelude to the formal announcement.276 And despite their role in approving most mergers, shareholders have a largely passive role in the combination, with approvals in the vast majority of cases.277
There is reason for concern that the market for corporate control does
not lead to a highly efficient and value-generating market. Because tender
offers and proposed acquisitions generally need to pay more than the shares’
272 NINA MUNK, FOOLS RUSH IN: STEVE CASE, JERRY LEVIN, AND THE UNMAKING OF AOL
TIME WARNER 142–43 (2004).
273 See, e.g., Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers’ Fairness Opinions in Corporate
Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 121–25 (1986). For a narrative example of the role of
financial advisors in a merger, see Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. Civ.A. 9700, 2003 WL
21003437, at *8–12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2003).
274 MUNK, supra note 272, at 166 (noting that the two investment banking firms
involved in the AOL–Time Warner merger each received a fee of $60 million); Giuffra,
supra note 273, at 127–28 (noting that “investment banks face strong incentives to provide
opinions that serve management’s interests”).
275 For the AOL–Time Warner merger, banks were given three days over a weekend to
prepare their fairness reports for the companies’ boards. MUNK, supra note 272, at 161–62.
As one of the bankers involved in the opinions noted, “If you do a deal over a weekend,
you take shortcuts. . . . In hindsight, it was sloppy.” Id. at 163.
276 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They
and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 37–45 (discussing the conflicts of interest that might lead to such a result); Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 1557, 1587 (2006) (noting that some contracts provide that the bank will only be paid,
or will be paid more handsomely, if the transaction is approved).
277 See Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 159,
169–71 (2008).
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current market price, there can be large abnormal returns for the target in
the short term.278 But over the long term, evidence suggests that corporate
combinations do not increase overall societal efficiency. Studies on longterm returns for corporate acquisitions have generally shown “strong evidence of abnormal under-performance[ ] following mergers.”279 The conventional wisdom is that corporate combinations do not bring long-term
gains.280 Even those who question whether corporate combinations have
generally poor results concede that a significant number of them have spectacularly poor results.281
Researchers have investigated the possibility that individual personality
traits may have an outsized effect on the market for corporate combinations.
For example, CEOs may be acting with hubris—an inflated sense of their
own abilities and the transactions they seek to effectuate.282 This hubris may
278 See Anup Agrawal & Jeffery F. Jaffe, The Post-Merger Performance Puzzle, in 1 ADVANCES
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 7, 7 (Cary Cooper & Alan Gregory eds., 2000).
279 Id. at 37. Afra Afsharipour & J. Travis Laster, Enhanced Scrutiny on the Buy-Side, 53
GA. L. REV. 443, 446 (2019) (“Empirical studies of acquisitions consistently find that public
company bidders often overpay for targets, imposing significant losses on bidder shareholders. Research also indicates that the losses represent true wealth destruction in the
aggregate and not simply a wealth transfer from bidder shareholders to target shareholders.” (footnotes omitted)); Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 597, 602 (1989); Feng Gu & Baruch Lev, Overpriced Shares, Ill-Advised Acquisitions, and
Goodwill Impairment, 86 ACCT. REV. 1995, 1996–97 (2011).
280 See, e.g., ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE
ASHES 14 (2005) (“The popular view is that M&A is a loser’s game.”); Robert G. Eccles,
Kersten L. Lanes & Thomas C. Wilson, Are You Paying Too Much for That Acquisition?, HARV.
BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1999, at 136, 136. (noting “30 years of evidence demonstrating that
most acquisitions don’t create value for the acquiring company’s shareholders”); James A.
Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 249, 280 (2001) (“Evidence from past merger waves shows that public companies engaging in mergers underperform their peer companies that have not followed similar acquisition strategies.” (citations omitted)); Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann
& René M. Stulz, Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201, 202 (2004)
(finding that takeovers by large firms have destroyed $312 billion of shareholder wealth
over twenty years); Gregory Zuckerman, Ahead of the Tape, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2002, at C1
(“Mergers just don’t work. A mountain of academic research shows most acquisitions end
up costing shareholders . . . .”).
281 See BRUNER, supra note 280, at 95–338 (discussing particularly poor performers).
The AOL and Time Warner combination, known as “the worst deal in history,” laid waste
to the market value of the new company and led to the departure of almost all of the
executives responsible for the union. KARA SWISHER, THERE MUST BE A PONY IN HERE SOMEWHERE: THE AOL TIME WARNER DEBACLE AND THE QUEST FOR A DIGITAL FUTURE 9–10
(2003). Three years after the completion of the merger, shareholders in AOL Time
Warner had lost over $200 billion in equity value. MUNK, supra note 272, at 277.
282 Richard Roll has argued that corporate takeovers were generally a value-neutral proposition, and that therefore rational executives would not seek them out. Richard Roll,
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 197–98 (1986) (“It will be argued
here that takeover gains may have been overestimated if they exist at all.”). In order to
explain the frequency of combinations, Roll relied not on rational market theory, but
rather managerial hubris. Id. at 199–200. Relying on the empirical evidence that individIN
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be a product of two types of systematic irrationalities known as behavioral
heuristics: the optimism bias and the commitment bias. These two heuristics
form what one commentator has labeled the optimism-commitment “whipsaw.”283 Scholars have keyed in on the effects of the optimism or overconfidence bias on high-level corporate decisionmakers.284 The optimism bias is
a documented phenomenon within financial markets.285 Subjects also
believe that their talents are above average.286 Relatedly, evidence also suggests that individuals underestimate others’ abilities, especially those of their
competitors.287
Another component of the optimism bias is the so-called “illusion of
control.” This irrationality means that “people not only think that they are
better than average when skill or ability is relevant to outcomes, they sometimes believe that they have more control over outcomes than they do.”288
High-level corporate executives may use these traits to rise to the top.289
ual decisionmaking is not always rational, Roll noted that takeovers were an apt subject for
such research, since takeovers reflect individual decisions. Id. at 199. Given that the data,
in his view, did not show added value from takeovers to the acquiring firm, Roll hypothesized that managerial hubris—namely, the notion that their (higher) valuation of the target was better than the market’s (lower) valuation—was responsible for takeover activity.
Id. at 199–200.
283 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 147
(1997).
284 See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37–39 (3d
ed. 1994) (discussing overconfidence among managers).
285 See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Financial Decision-Making in
Markets and Firms: A Behavioral Perspective, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: FINANCE 385, 389 (R.A. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic & W.T. Ziemba eds.,
1995) (“Perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are
overconfident.”).
286 See David Dunning, Judith A. Meyerowitz & Amy D. Holzberg, Ambiguity and SelfEvaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 324, 324 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds.,
2002) (finding that seventy percent of high school students in one study rated themselves
above average in leadership skills, while only two percent ranked themselves below average
on that dimension); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow
Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981) (finding that most drivers believe they are
above-average drivers); Ezra W. Zuckerman & John T. Jost, What Makes You Think You’re So
Popular? Self-Evaluation Maintenance and the Subjective Side of the “Friendship Paradox,” 64 SOC.
PSYCH. Q. 207, 207 (2001).
287 A notable example of such behavior is the case of “Rahodeb,” the online username
for Whole Foods CEO John Mackey. Mackey used his anonymous online account to praise
Whole Foods and pillory competitor Wild Oats. David Kesmodel & John R. Wilke, Whole
Foods Is Hot, Wild Oats a Dud—So Said ‘Rahodeb’; Then Again, Yahoo Poster Was a Whole Foods
Staffer, the CEO To Be Precise, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at A1.
288 Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 288 (2006); see generally Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of
Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 311 (1975).
289 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Essay, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from
the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL308.txt

1310

unknown

Seq: 54

notre dame law review

18-JAN-21

11:49

[vol. 96:3

However, those same irrationalities may work against the company’s fortunes
when applied to business decisions. And in fact, research has shown that
executive overconfidence has demonstrated effects on corporate decisionmaking. According to the research, executive overconfidence leads to excessive entry into unfamiliar markets,290 overpaying in the context of
auctions,291 an overreliance on the executive’s personal information and perspective,292 and a belief that the market is undervaluing the executive’s own
company.293 As a result, executive overconfidence may lead to a consistent
pattern of overconfidence in one’s judgments and abilities.294 The “whipsaw” phenomenon combines this tendency toward overconfidence with a
commitment to one’s positions, even when it is clear that the original idea
was a bad one.295 This reluctance to abandon prior sunk costs is known as
the commitment bias.296 Studies have demonstrated this bias within the corporate world.297
The market for corporate control is almost a perfect convergence of a
high-negotiability market: high stakes, individuated sales, personal and secret
negotiations, significant individual decision-making power, and fairly limited
review. The possibility for widely divergent prices would not be as problematic if the transactions involved only individual wealth. But CEOs are using
shareholders’ value and property in effectuating these deals. It is not their
money. In fact, the deals are often structured to make sure that the execuControls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004) (noting that “over-optimism, an inflated sense of selfefficacy and a deep capacity for ethical self-deception are favored in corporate promotion
tournaments, so that people who possess them are disproportionately represented in executive suites”); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 969 (2002). For a
brief overview of the tournament theory for managerial talent, see Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1586–87 (2005).
290 Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 306 (1999).
291 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 50–60 (1992).
292 Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 301, 302 (2001).
293 J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33, 34 (2002);
Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN.
2661, 2662 (2005).
294 Directors can also suffer from optimism bias. Ted Turner, a Time Warner board
member and its largest shareholder, announced that he had voted for the 2000 merger
“with as much or more excitement and enthusiasm as I did when I first made love some
forty-two years ago.” MUNK, supra note 272, at 179.
295 See Langevoort, supra note 283, at 147.
296 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 782–83 (2002).
297 See, e.g., Charles R. Schwenk, Information, Cognitive Biases, and Commitment to a Course
of Action, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 298, 298 (1986); Barry M. Staw, Rationality and Justification in
Organizational Life, in 2 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 45, 57–58 (Barry M. Staw &
Larry L. Cummings eds., 1980).
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tives involved are paid handsomely, no matter how good the deal is for their
side.298
Corporate law has a variety of mechanisms to protect various players,
especially shareholders, against opportunism within the system. As an example, when a majority shareholder is buying out minority shareholders, the
obvious conflict of interest is managed through a set of special voting mechanisms or the “entire fairness” test.299 Mechanisms are more limited, however, when it comes to protections against bad negotiating. As noted earlier,
deals must generally be approved by both the board of directors and the
shareholders. But given the crush of time, the availability of information, the
rational ignorance of shareholders, and the potential for onerous deal protection provisions, these approvals may not be a sufficient filter for badly
negotiated deals.
Shareholders in a target company also have the appraisal remedy if they
are not comfortable with the deal. Under state law, appraisal allows the
stockholder to forgo the merger consideration and instead file a judicial proceeding to determine an alternative fair value of the shares.300 Long derided
as creaky, cumbersome, and little used,301 appraisal became more popular in
the early 2000s and even led to “appraisal arbitrage,” the practice of purchasing shares after a merger’s announcement with the intent of using the
appraisal remedy.302 In response to concerns of litigation opportunism, the
Delaware legislature amended its corporate law to make appraisal suits more
difficult to bring.303 And in 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court issued two
important decisions emphasizing that deal price was the primary measure of

298 When a small company is being merged into a bigger company, the so-called “target” company will often pay its departing executives a “golden parachute” to insure a soft
landing from the departure. Companies also give executive bonuses when they are on the
acquiring end of the deal. According to one study, the acquiring company’s CEO received
a gratuitous multimillion-dollar bonus in about forty percent of acquisitions. Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses, 73 J. FIN.
ECON. 119, 125–26 (2004).
299 See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014) (“Where a transaction involving self-dealing by a controlling stockholder is challenged, the applicable standard of judicial review is ‘entire fairness,’ with the defendants having the burden of
persuasion.” (citations omitted)).
300 Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2015); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2020).
301 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 300, at 1553 (noting the “prevailing academic view”
that appraisal was “seldom utilized” and “too cumbersome for stockholders to call upon
profitably” (footnotes omitted)).
302 Id. at 1153–56.
303 The amendments required appraisal petitioners to meet threshold requirements,
such as the consideration for the shares equaling at least $1 million, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262(g), and also allowed corporations to reduce the amount of prejudgment interest
that they potentially owed, id. § 262(h).
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fair value for lower courts to use in appraisal proceedings.304 Delaware’s
changes to the appraisal doctrine seem to have weakened the remedy
significantly.305
The merits of a stronger appraisal remedy are much debated: proponents cite to evidence that target companies received better deals in the
shadow of a stronger appraisal remedy,306 while opponents lack faith in a
judicial system of valuation.307 Both the opponents and the Delaware
Supreme Court place significant trust in the “market price” as negotiated
between the parties.308 The court has also focused on the specifics of the
process, with the negotiated price receiving deference if proper procedures
have been followed.309 But the market for corporate control has significantly
high negotiation variance when it comes to the actual assessment of the corporation’s control premium. The idea of one particular “market price”
becomes more akin to a “market price zone” with considerable discretion
within. As such, there should be less faith that this market would find the
appropriate price on its own.
304 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 5, 23–24
(Del. 2017); DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 366 (Del.
2017).
305 Wei Jiang, Tao Li & Randall Thomas, The Long Rise and Quick Fall of Appraisal Arbitrage 51 (Vand. U. L. Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 20-16, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3546281 (finding that “while the returns to appraisal arbitrage
were robust during 2000–2014, they fell drastically in 2015–[2019] because of changes to
the Delaware appraisal statute and adverse opinions of the Delaware Supreme Court in the
DFC Global and Dell cases”).
306 See Audra Boone, Brian Broughman & Antonio J. Macias, Merger Negotiations in the
Shadow of Judicial Appraisal, 62 J.L. & ECON. 281, 283 (2019) (“We find—consistent with
shareholder protection—that shareholders of Delaware targets receive higher acquisition
premiums and abnormal returns following events that strengthen the appraisal remedy
compared with deals involving non-Delaware targets over the same period.”).
307 William J. Carney & Keith Sharfman, The Death of Appraisal Arbitrage: Ending Windfalls for Deal Dissenters, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 61, 109 (2018) (“We have mainly argued here for
reliance on the pre-deal market price for share valuation in appraisal litigation involving
public companies. To achieve this result, the courts would simply need to give actual
respect to market prices rather than merely pay them lip service as the Supreme Court has
consistently done, most recently in Dell and DFC.”).
308 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“[E]conomic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair
value was the deal price, as it resulted from an open process, informed by robust public
information, and easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which many parties
with an incentive to make a profit had a chance to bid.”); Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers,
The Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell and DFC Global, 68 EMORY L.J. 221, 224 (2018) (“The
Supreme Court’s message to the trial courts is simple: absent a culpable breach of duty,
trust the market and have faith in the negotiated price.”).
309 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (noting that “the transaction resulted from a robust market
search that lasted approximately two years in which financial and strategic buyers had an
open opportunity to buy without inhibition of deal protections”); Guhan Subramanian,
Appraisal After Dell, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING
UP? 222, 226 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (recommending a safe harbor if the process is “pristine”).
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A comprehensive review of the merger process and its regulatory oversight are beyond the scope of this Article. But the market for corporate control is notable for its combination of high negotiation variance and high
stakes. The law of corporate combinations reflects the tension between the
traditional approach of leaving people to their bargains and the desire to
protect people—especially weaker parties—from the consequences of bad
negotiating. Courts, lawmakers, and commentators should more explicitly
take the negotiation process into account and understand the role that negotiation effectiveness can play in this high-variance market.
3. Market for Employment
As a general matter, the market for employment has a high variance
based on negotiated outcomes. A number of factors contribute to this negotiability: the uniqueness of each person’s match to a particular job; the
importance of employment to the applicant; the fact that employment is a
status market;310 the difficulty in obtaining clear and reliable information
about the applicant and the employer; the expectation of negotiation; and
the general lack of pay transparency.
The law has generally focused on structural issues within the employment market that disadvantage larger swaths of workers. The National Labor
Relations Act311 is specifically directed at the “inequality of bargaining
power” between employees and employers and provides a mechanism for collective representation.312 Along with the rights to act collectively, the key
provision is the requirement that both unions and employers bargain
together in good faith over terms and conditions of employment.313 Goodfaith bargaining focuses both on procedural concerns, such as time spent, as
well as negotiating tactics, such as openness to compromise.314 But the parties are not required to agree, nor are they required to make any substantive
proposals. Labor law is primarily about shifting the structure of the labor
market from one of individual bargaining to one of collective negotiation.315
The negotiation effectiveness of the parties can play a significant role in specific bargaining sessions, but the law does not do much to police the bargaining behavior of the parties.
310 ASPERS, supra note 149, at 88.
311 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2018).
312 Id. § 151.
313 Id. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3).
314 Id. § 158(d).
315 Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (1958)
(“The most important purpose of the Wagner Act was to create aggregations of economic
power on the side of employees countervailing the existing power of corporations to establish labor standards.”). One popular suggested reform is the move to sectoral bargaining,
rather than enterprise bargaining. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Union Rights for All: Toward
Sectoral Bargaining in the United States, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR LAW FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 56, 57–59 (Richard Bales & Charlotte Garden eds., 2020).
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As to individual employees, the primary legal interventions are
mandatory minimums and antidiscrimination provisions. One of the first
mandatory terms was the ban on yellow-dog contracts; employers could not
bargain with employees to forgo their right to unionize.316 Many more have
followed, including minimum wage and overtime provisions,317 unpaid family and medical leave,318 workplace safety requirements,319 health insurance
coverage,320 and unemployment insurance.321 These required terms circumvent the need to bargain. In addition, federal antidiscrimination provisions
shield those who fall into protected classes.322 The law of employment structures the basics of the relationship such that employers and employees know
that a certain foundational level of wages and benefits will be offered, no
matter what the parties negotiate.
Within these constraints, however, there still exists for many workers a
range of possible outcomes that varies depending on negotiation effectiveness. And the variance can play out in troubling ways. As discussed in Part II,
significant discrepancies in pay for women and people of color persist
despite antidiscrimination provisions.323 The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was an
effort to rectify the imbalance between men’s and women’s salaries by requiring equal pay for equal work.324 The statute specifies that employees shall
not be paid less based on gender if they are doing “equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions.”325 Much of the
debate over gender-based pay discrepancies has centered around comparable worth—namely, the extent to which different types of jobs that have different gender profiles should nevertheless have similar wage structures
316 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1037 n.146 (1996) (“‘Yellow
dog contracts’ are employment contracts in which workers promise not to join a union in
order to obtain employment. They were prevalent in the early decades of the twentieth
century and were approved by the Supreme Court in the Hitchman Coal and Coppage
cases.”). The Norris-LaGuardia Act banned such contracts. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90,
§ 3, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 103 (2018)).
317 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–07 (providing for federal minimum wages and overtime).
318 Id. §§ 2601–54 (providing for family and medical leave).
319 Id. §§ 651–78.
320 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2018).
321 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 1051 (7th ed. 2011)
(“Fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have individual unemployment
insurance (UI) programs determining the length of unemployment insurance benefits and
their amounts for qualifying recipients.”).
322 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018) (prohibiting discrimination against employees based on race, sex, ethnicity, or religion); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (prohibiting discrimination against employees based on age); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination
against employees based on disability).
323 See subsection II.C.4 supra.
324 Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)).
325 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
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because their positions are comparable.326 However, even the basics of fair
pay—the notion that people in the same job description should have the
same pay structure—have proven exceedingly difficult to effectuate. Because
such claims can be difficult to unearth, Congress was moved to extend the
statute of limitations for such claims to allow for after-the-fact discovery.327
But because individual workers are generally loath to share salary information, workers may never find out about the disparity no matter how long they
have to file a suit.328 Some employers may further inhibit disclosure by trying to label salary information confidential.
Academics have generally approached these complex issues of pay discrimination as a combination of discrimination and information disparity,
and many have proposed transparency as a reform.329 Undoubtedly, information about coworkers’ pay would inform employee efforts to make sure
they are paid appropriately. But negotiation plays a role here as well. Certain groups may not negotiate for the same level of salary, either because of
individual preferences, societal norms, or discrimination against hard bargaining by those groups.330 As a result, employers may have systemic and
even severe pay disparities without intentional discrimination due to negotiating disparities.331
The proposed Paycheck Fairness Act332 endeavors to address the issue of
negotiation difference. The legislation would broaden the scope for comparable pay, tighten up exceptions to the Equal Pay Act, and provide for compensatory and punitive damages.333 On the information front, it would
require employers to disclose salaries to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and would protect workers against retaliation for talking about
their pay with other employees.334 The Department of Labor would be
tasked with “conducting and promoting research . . . [surrounding] pay dis326 See, e.g., Janice R. Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, 69
IOWA L. REV. 655, 655, 658 n.16 (1984).
327 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5.
328 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 176, at 176; Edwards, supra note 176, at 55–56.
329 See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based
Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 958 (2011) (“[G]ender pay discrimination should be viewed as a market failure caused, in part, by pay secrecy and information
asymmetries about market wages.”); Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 781, 783 (2014) (“I conclude that there
is a fairly strong though not uncomplicated case to be made that mandatory disclosure of
meaningful salary information would tend to produce less discrimination, less favoritism,
and probably somewhat lower disparities overall.”); Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1046–47 (2012) (proposing incentives for employers to
provide pay transparency).
330 See subsection II.C.4 supra.
331 Ramachandran, supra note 329, at 1045 (“[N]either the employer nor the employee
is entirely at ‘fault,’ in the commonly understood sense of the term, when that employee
has been socialized not to apply for certain jobs or to ask for more money.”).
332 Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 116th Cong. (2019).
333 Id. § 3.
334 Id. §§ 3(b), 8.
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parities, with specific attention paid to women and girls from historically
underrepresented and minority groups.”335 But in addition to these provisions, the Act would provide funding for the Secretary of Labor to “make
grants on a competitive basis to eligible entities to carry out negotiation skills
training programs for the purposes of addressing pay disparities, including
through outreach to women and girls.336 The grants would be available for
state and local governments, as well as private nonprofits. The Department
would also have to implement regulations or policy guidance providing for
the integration of negotiation skills training into existing programs at the
Departments of Labor and Education.337 After eighteen months, the Secretary would provide a report on the Department’s training efforts.338
The Paycheck Fairness Act’s efforts to explicitly address negotiation disparities illustrates an understanding of the role of negotiation in cementing
and deepening discriminatory practices even after overt discrimination has
been addressed. When examining markets such as employment for their
inefficiencies and injustices, academics and policymakers have looked to
structural economic bargaining power and information asymmetries to
address market problems. But disparities in negotiation effectiveness are an
important factor, too. We should determine whether markers have a high or
low negotiation variance, and if high, then whether there are systemic disparities caused by differences in negotiation effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
The technological advances of the twenty-first century are rapidly changing many marketplaces. Online auctions have loosened time and place
restrictions to enable bidding for extended periods with participants from all
over the world. Web-based merchants such as Amazon allow for the convenience of delivery and a wealth of potential choices—along with the fear that
its efficiencies will enable it to consume the marketplace.339 Social media
companies provide their services to users at no monetary cost but take in
enormous amounts of data and then charge advertisers for access.340 Website shopping algorithms find the best deals for customers based on their

335 Id. § 6(a)(1).
336 Id. § 5(a)(2).
337 Id. § 5(b) (covering programs under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–76, the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of
2006, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301–08, the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1001, and
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3361).
338 Id. § 5(c).
339 Stacy Mitchell, Amazon Doesn’t Just Want to Dominate the Market—It Wants to Become the
Market, THE NATION (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/amazondoesnt-just-want-to-dominate-the-market-it-wants-to-become-the-market/.
340 Levmore & Fagan, supra note 6, at 1516.
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preferences.341 Our markets may develop radically transformed structures
even sooner than we think.342
As we move into the future of capitalism, it is important to recognize and
study the role of negotiation in market dynamics. The law has largely not
recognized the role of negotiation variance in markets explicitly, even
though many doctrines evidence the ripples of this concern. Scholars should
identify negotiation variance as a factor and then research its effects within
particular markets. In some situations, transparency and disclosure of terms
will equalize the playing field and eliminate whatever nefarious effects negotiation variance may have.343 However, in many markets negotiations will
remain necessary to establish price and terms and to divide the surplus
between parties. Ignoring the role of bargaining or wishing it away does not
realistically deal with the potential problems.
This Article is an effort to develop further study of the role of negotiation in markets, particularly in the field of law. While much research on
markets and negotiation has already been conducted in the fields of economics, behavioral psychology, social psychology, and sociology, more attention
should be paid to the specific role of negotiation and the effects that negotiation variance has on the market players. As we develop a more nuanced
understanding of the interplay between bargaining, markets, transactions,
and the law, we expect that the construction and regulation of markets will
better handle the complexities of these interactions and provide for fairer
allocations.

341 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE AGE
BIG DATA 61 (2018) (“[A] computer may be capable of transacting in the marketplace
better than we can or, at the very least . . . can greatly aid humans in conducting market
transactions . . . .”).
342 Id. at 212 (predicting that data will replace price as the salient aspect of
transactions).
343 Levmore & Fagan, supra note 6, at 1470–71 (arguing that transparency in pricing
and nonnegotiability will improve efficiency and lower costs).
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